OP-ED: IS ISRAEL SAFER TODAY?

By John Spencer

Is Israel Safer Today?

It is hard to call any war's outcome while it is still happening. Anyone who tells you otherwise is either not paying attention or not being straight with you. But that is different from refusing to ask the question at all. So here it is, plainly: Is Israel safer today, from a national security standpoint, than it was on October 6, 2023? The answer is yes.

That will be uncomfortable for some people to read. The grief of October 7 has not faded. The cost in Israeli lives, in soldiers killed across multiple fronts, in hostages taken and the years required to bring them home, was real and enormous. But national security is not measured in these factors. It is measured in relative capability, freedom of action, and the ability to deter or defeat threats. It is measured in threats eliminated, enemies degraded, and the military balance shifted. On those terms, what has happened since October 7 is something few strategic analysts would have predicted when the smoke was still rising over Southern Israel.

The strategic paradigms that governed the Middle East for decades have shifted. Not all of them. Not fully. But the shift is real, larger than is yet fully understood, and Israel drove it.

The End of Containment

Before October 7, a certain logic governed how threats to Israel were managed: contain, deter, respond proportionally. The basic assumption was that acting decisively against clearly growing threats, such as Hezbollah's missile buildup and Iran's nuclear program, would trigger a larger war nobody wanted. So the threats were tolerated and managed. Calibrated responses to provocations were limited to avoid escalation or trigger a broader strategic dilemma with international partners but strong enough to show resolve. Rocket diplomacy. Both sides understood the basic rules. Israel played within them while Iran and proxies plotted to grow within them until they achieved the point they felt ready to attack.

Over years of recurring attacks, this de facto system of constrained escalation had taken hold. Violence became routine, escalation remained bounded, and major war was avoided despite repeated provocations and growth of Israel’s adversaries. That pattern reinforced a dangerous assumption among those adversaries: that Israel's strategic freedom of action was structurally limited, that its air defenses could absorb sustained punishment, and that international pressure would constrain it to proportional responses even after severe attacks. Hamas internalized the belief that even a dramatic assault would fold into the established cycle of retaliation rather than trigger a fundamental shift.

With Iran's support and awareness, Hamas unleashed the greatest attack on Jewish people since the Holocaust, October 7, that ended the decades-long status quo on every front. What replaced it will define the region for a generation. In effect, Israel’s adversaries came to believe that escalation thresholds were fixed and that Israel would operate within them regardless of provocation.

Iran: The Twelve-Day War and What Came After

Major moves came in April and October 2024, when Iran openly attacked Israel, including what was the largest ballistic missile attack ever launched by one state against another. Then, in June 2025, acting unilaterally, Israel launched Operation Rising Lion, a twelve-day campaign against Iran that stunned the world. On the opening nightalone, the Israeli Air Force flew more than 200 fighter jets in five waves of strikes, dropping over 330 munitions against roughly 100 targets. These included the Natanz Enrichment Complex and sites in Tehran, Tabriz, Hamadan, Qom, Isfahan, and Kermanshah. In the first hours of the operation, at least 20 senior Iranian military commanders and numerous nuclear scientists were killed nearly simultaneously, disrupting Iran’s ability to coordinate any coherent response.

By the end of the twelve days, Israeli reporting indicates that more than 900 targets had been struck across Iran. The United States then joined in Operation Midnight Hammer, conducting follow-on strikes that further degraded Iran’s key nuclear facilities. Israeli and U.S. assessments indicate that more than 30 senior Iranian military leaders were killed, including Armed Forces Chief of Staff Major General Mohammad Bagheri, IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami, IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Qaani, and IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh. At least 14 senior nuclear scientists were also eliminated. More than 70 air defense batteries were destroyed, along with a significant portion of Iran’s ballistic missile launchers and missile stockpile. The Israeli Air Force flew more than 1,200 sorties during the campaign, supported by over 600 aerial refueling missions.

The Mossad had spent years preparing the battlefield from within, laying the foundation for what followed. Precision weapons, targeting systems, and components were smuggled into Iran, enabling operatives to establish a covert drone base near Tehran that disrupted air defenses and missile systems in the opening hours, before a single Israeli aircraft crossed Iranian airspace. What followed demonstrated something even more consequential. Israel proved it could project power at distances and scale few believed possible, penetrating Iranian airspace, suppressing its defenses, and operating with periods of localized air superiority. The F-35I Adir flew its first combat strike operations in history during the campaign, its indigenous electronic warfare systems optimized against regional air defense architectures derived from Russian platforms. Together, these actions revealed a military not confined to defense, but capable of sustained, precise, and overwhelming offensive operations deep inside a major adversary’s territory.

Iran fired back, launching approximately 550 missiles and 1,000 drones at Israel over twelve days. Israeli and coalition defenses intercepted 90 percent of ballistic missiles and 99 percent of drones. What made this response unprecedented was not only its effectiveness, but who was involved. The United States and regional partners played active roles in Israel’s defense, and Jordan’s air force intercepted Iranian drones within its own airspace. Quiet coordination with other Arab states, including intelligence sharing and early warning, contributed to the broader defensive effort. For the first time, elements of the region that had long stood apart from Israel were actively participating in defending it against a common threat.

What the world saw in those twelve days was something it had not seen before: a small nation, with no shared border with its target, executing a sustained, multi-domain military campaign against a far larger adversary at range and at scale. The operation disrupted long-standing assumptions about Iranian deterrence, exposed critical weaknesses in its air defenses, and demonstrated that Israel could integrate intelligence, airpower, cyber capabilities, and long-range strike in ways few had fully appreciated. It showed a level of operational reach, coordination, and precision that placed Israel in a different category of military power than many had previously assumed.

February 2026 went further. On February 28, the United States and Israel launched Operation Epic Fury and Operation Roaring Lion. From the opening waves on February 28 through the sustained multi-week campaign, the combined forces conducted thousands of strikes against what remained of Iran’s nuclear program, its ballistic missile architecture and production facilities, air defenses, naval assets, and senior leadership. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the man who spent decades calling for Israel’s destruction, was killed in the initial wave, along with dozens of other top IRGC commanders. The United States and Israel rapidly established and maintained air superiority over Iran for the duration of major combat operations. The Israeli Air Force executed the largest operation in its history under Operation Roaring Lion, flying over 8,500 operational sorties and dropping over 18,000 munitions across more than 10,800 strikes. Israeli military assessments indicate that 28 senior Iranian regime leaders were eliminated, more than 250 air defense systems dismantled, and a majority of missile launchers neutralized. These strikes included the systematic degradation of Iran’s ballistic missile program, dismantling air defense systems, and targeting IRGC command centers, weapons facilities, and regime infrastructure across Tehran and other cities. U.S. military assessments indicate that American forces struck over 13,000 targets, destroyed more than 150 Iranian vessels and severely degraded Iran’s weapons production and nuclear infrastructure.

What made this moment historic was not only the scale of destruction, but what it revealed about Israel’s role alongside the United States. Israel did not operate as a dependent partner. It operated as a fully capable one. Senior U.S. defense leaders described Israel as the kind of ally the United States seeks in modern war: capable, willing, and able to operate at a level approaching parity in key domains. General officers involved in the campaign emphasized that Israel’s performance, from strike integration to intelligence and operational tempo, placed it in a category few allies occupy. For perhaps the first time, Israel demonstrated not just that it can defend itself, but that it can fight alongside the United States in large-scale, high-intensity operations as a true peer contributor.

While we do not know what will ultimately happen in the war, Iran has suffered a decisive military defeat and is now significantly weaker, with drastically reduced means and a fundamentally different strategic calculation about attacking Israel. Its nuclear infrastructure has been heavily degraded, a large portion of its ballistic missile launchers and production capacity destroyed, its navy crippled (with over 90% of its largest vessels damaged or destroyed), and its air-defense systems largely eliminated. Every proxy it built has been either destroyed, decimated, or severely degraded. The strategy of surrounding Israel with a ring of fire while sheltering behind deterrence failed completely. The cumulative effect was not simply battlefield success, but the collapse of Iran’s layered deterrence model, which had relied on distance, proxies, and escalation risk to constrain Israeli action.

Hezbollah

On October 6, 2023, Hezbollah was the most capable non-state military force on earth: more than 150,000 rockets and missiles, hardened tunnels across southern Lebanon, an estimated 100,000 trained fighters, combat veterans from Syria, and a command structure built over three decades with one strategic purpose. It functioned as the forward arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, funded, trained, and directed from Tehran. The military consensus was that a full war would be catastrophic for both sides.

Then Israel killed Hassan Nasrallah. The decision to assassinate Hezbollah's secretary-general on September 27, 2024 was considered by many serious analysts to be a moment that could trigger exactly the wider war everyone feared. Killing Nasrallah, who had led the organization for thirty-two years and served as Iran's most important regional partner, was expected to force Tehran's hand. Iran blinked. Israel kept going.

Right before the strike on Nasrallah, the pager operation had shredded Hezbollah’s command network in a single day, wounding and killing operatives across Lebanon through compromised communications devices. The operation was so deeply penetrating that it told the world something important: Israel had been inside Hezbollah for years, and Hezbollah never knew it. Senior leadership was systematically eliminated. Weapons stockpiles were destroyed.

The pressure has continued. According to IDF reporting, more than 1,700 Hezbollah fighters have been eliminated, more than 2,500 aircraft sorties conducted, over 5,000 targets struck from the air, and more than 14,900 artillery strikes carried out against Hezbollah targets in Beirut, the Beqaa Valley, and southern Lebanon, hitting command rooms, intelligence headquarters, and operational planning centers. The IDF has described the campaign as more devastating than the pager operation. That is a remarkable thing to say about any strike. Hezbollah, once Iran’s most important regional partner, now operates with significantly reduced external support and diminished regional integration.

Here too, time will tell whether ongoing talks with the Lebanese government will produce a new regional paradigm. The central question is whether Hezbollah will be allowed to retain freedom of maneuver in southern Lebanon while continuing to hold political power inside the government. What is already clear is that the diplomatic space Israel has created has given Lebanon a historic opportunity. Signals are emerging, from the Lebanese president to everyday citizens, rejecting both IRGC presence and Hezbollah’s control across the country. The Lebanese Armed Forces have conducted visible disarming and demilitarizing operations in areas once dominated by Hezbollah. Whether that effort endures will determine whether this moment becomes a lasting shift or another temporary disruption.

Hamas

Hamas launched October 7 believing the political fallout would force a quick Israeli halt and ultimately contribute to Israel’s destruction. It was wrong. The hostages are home. Its senior leadership and echelons of trained fighters have been killed. It can now operate in less than 50 percent of Gaza. Its military infrastructure is being destroyed. Its prized tunnel network is being dismantled piece by piece. Most importantly, it is completely isolated from external support, resupply, and rearming.

The pressure is now being formalized through the implementation of the 20-point peace plan. Hamas has rejected the disarmament timeline, a decision that may warrant a return to military action. More importantly, the plan establishes the end state: the complete removal of Hamas as the governing authority in Gaza and as an armed militant organization.

Syria

Bashar al-Assad fell in December 2024. For Iran, it was a strategic catastrophe. Syria was the land bridge, the primary resupply route for moving weapons from Iran into Hezbollah's hands in Lebanon. That route is gone.

Israel did not wait to see what came next. In the 48 hours following Assad's collapse, the IDF conducted over 480 strikes across Syria, destroying a large portion of Syria’s remaining strategic weapons stockpiles, its entire naval fleet, dozens of fighter jets and helicopters, air defense systems, and chemical weapons sites. The logic was straightforward: whatever government emerged from Syria's chaos would not inherit an arsenal capable of threatening Israel or its neighbors. The buffer zone in the Golan Heights is now under Israeli control.

Syria under Assad was the connective tissue of Iran's axis of resistance. It housed Iranian advisors, hosted weapons transfers, provided strategic depth for Hezbollah, and gave Tehran a forward position close to Israel's border. All of that is gone. What Syria becomes next is genuinely uncertain. What it no longer is, for now, is a weapons corridor and operational platform pointed at Israel.

The West Bank

This is the hardest part of the picture to assess honestly. Militant activity has intensified. Israeli security operations have expanded. The political stability of the territory is contested and unresolved.

But context matters. The West Bank once operated within a regional environment where a powerful Hezbollah to the north, capable Hamas in Gaza, and an Iran projecting power across multiple fronts created layered external pressure on Israel's decision space. That environment has changed substantially. The external backers are now isolated and degraded. The military architecture that once gave them confidence has been dismantled. The underlying political questions remain genuinely difficult. The security picture is different.

The Strategic Shift

Step back from the individual fronts and something larger comes into view. The Abraham Accords held. That alone defied widespread predictions after October 7. When Iran launched direct missile and drone attacks on Israel in April 2024 and again in October 2024, Arab states that had normalized relations with Israel helped defend it. Jordan intercepted Iranian drones. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and others provided intelligence cooperation. Arab nations actively participated in Israel’s defense against Iranian attack. Before October 7 that sentence would not have appeared in any serious strategic planning document.

The June 2025 campaign and Operation Epic Fury demonstrated military capabilities the world did not fully understand Israel possessed. Range, precision, multi-domain integration, and intelligence penetration at a level that places it in a different tier of military power entirely. Defense cooperation agreements with Germany, Azerbaijan, and India have deepened. Israel's defense export contracts have grown significantly, driven by international demand for air defense technology, drone systems, and vast expertise developed under combat conditions.

The old rules are gone. The containment strategy that permitted threats to accumulate on every border for years while the world advised caution was ended not by diplomacy but by force.

What Has Not Changed, yet. Or may not change.

None of this argues that Israel's problems are solved. The West Bank remains unstable. Gaza's political future is unresolved. The new Iranian leadership has pledged continuity with its predecessor's commitments. The Islamic Republic cannot be trusted, as its recent actions in the Strait of Hormuz make plain. A degraded adversary remains an adversary, and one that will adapt if given time and space. Iran's capacity to rebuild proxies and project threats over time has not been permanently eliminated.

For now, Iran retains the capacity to rebuild. Its industrial base, surviving leadership, and enduring ideological commitment to confrontation with Israel have not disappeared. History is clear on this point. Adversaries that are degraded are not defeated unless they are prevented from adapting. They disperse, learn, and regenerate. Strategic advantage, therefore, is always conditional, never permanent. What happens inside Iran, how the regional order evolves, and whether Israel can translate battlefield success into sustained strategic effect will matter just as much as the victories already achieved.

The Bottom Line

National security is about the future, not absolution for the past. Iran is weaker. Its nuclear program has been set back. Its missile arsenal has been degraded and much of its production capacity destroyed. Its economy lies shattered, placing pressure on Tehran to negotiate that it did not face on October 6, 2023. Its proxies, the network it spent decades and billions building as a forward edge against Israel, have been broken into isolated pieces. Hezbollah is a fraction of what it was. Hamas faces extinction as a governing and military force. The Abraham Accords survived a war that was supposed to destroy them. Arab nations defended Israel from Iranian attack. Syria’s arsenal has been neutralized and its role as an Iranian weapons corridor ended.

Hezbollah is alone in Lebanon. Hamas is alone in Gaza. The Houthis are alone in Yemen. And most importantly, the Ayatollahs left alive in Tehran are increasingly isolated, with fewer options. The ring of fire Tehran spent decades building around Israel has been largely dismantled. The strategic paradigm that permitted threats to grow unchecked because acting on them seemed too dangerous has been replaced by a different logic: the cost of inaction exceeds the cost of action.

Is Israel safer today? By every measure that counts in national security, yes.

Photo Credit: Shutterstock - Shabtay

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John Spencer, The MirYam Institute Senior Analyst On Urban & Asymmetrical Warfare. He is considered one of the world’s leading urban warfare experts and has conducted extensive on the ground research in Israel and Gaza since October 7th. Read full bio here.

OP-ED: LEBANON ARENA

By Yaakov Lappin

IDF establishes four-tier defense in southern Lebanon as ground maneuver dismantles Hezbollah strongholds

The Israel Defense Forces has officially classified Lebanon as the primary war arena, as it implements a major ground maneuver with five divisions to systematically dismantle Hezbollah's military infrastructure and establish a long-term four-tier defense buffer zone to protect northern communities.

The strategic shift allows the Israeli Air Force to concentrate its operations over Lebanese territory while observing the U.S.-led ceasefire with Iran. Lebanon is defined as the main operational front at this stage.

The military marks these achievements on April 13, the eve of Yom HaShoah, the national Holocaust Remembrance Day. Eighty-one years since the end of World War II, in the midst of a multi-front conflict with genocidal jihadist enemies, we take a day to remember the industrial genocide of six million Jews. The modern State of Israel confronts adversaries possessing similar intents, utilizing the instruments of a sovereign nation-state and a powerful military to successfully protect the population this time.

In southern Lebanon, the IDF is currently surrounding and securing Bint Jbeil, a city that previously served as a central symbol and operational hub for Hezbollah. The military expects to establish full operational control of the city within days, with only a small number of terrorists remaining.

Hezbollah had prepared the city as a primary launchpad for cross-border raids into northern Israel by its death squads. Now, the raid threat along with the anti-tank missile fire, has been removed.

Inside Bint Jbeil, Hezbollah systematically utilized a Lebanese government hospital as a fortified military base. IDF soldiers identified several terrorists conducting surveillance and firing on troops from the hospital windows. Following the initial engagement, the military neutralized the terrorists as they tried to exit the hospital.

Ground forces searching the facility subsequently located a cache of weapons stored inside.

To permanently secure the northern communities, the military is constructing four distinct lines of defense.  

The first line rests directly on the border, involving significant engineering operations to destroy structures used by Hezbollah to prepare invasion launchpads. This line has seen the IDF expand its number of positions from 5 to 15.

The second line involves defensive strongpoints within Lebanon. The third layer neutralizes direct-fire anti-tank missile threats to northern communities. The final boundary is the Litani River. The IDF will control the entire zone to prevent the infiltration of additional terrorists and will not allow hundreds of thousands of southern Lebanese residents, primarily Shi'ites used by Hezbollah to build a shadow, Iranian-backed state, to return until the security of northern Israel can be assured.

The campaign inflicted severe damage on Hezbollah's fighting force, including the IDF's Operation Eternal Darkness, which was an extraordinarily strong blow that saw dozens of fighter jets strike some 100 targets throughout Lebanon in the space of ten minutes.

 Over 250 terrorists were eliminated in that strike, bringing the number of estimated Hezbollah casualties since March 2 to over 1,500, more than double the number of casualties Hezbollah sustained in the 2006 Second Lebanon War. This includes hundreds of terrorists from the elite Radwan terror unit, whose job was to spearhead the planned Hezbollah invasion of the Galilee – a plan Hamas ended up copying and applying to southern Israel on October 7, 2023.

Hezbollah continues to launch large volumes of fire at Israel. Since entering the war on March 2, the terror group has fired over 6,500 projectiles, including rockets and unmanned aerial vehicles. Half of these projectiles originated from south of the Litani River, an area where the Lebanese government and UNIFIL previously falsely claimed Hezbollah had been disarmed. The remaining half was launched from north of the Litani. UNIFIL forces, responsible for enforcing UN Security Council Resolution 1701, engaged in complete theatrics, allowing Hezbollah to operate freely. The IDF has responded by striking more than 4,300 terror infrastructure targets across Lebanon and dismantling 200 rocket launchers.

The military offensive systematically dismantles the shadow state Hezbollah built to sustain its forces.

Iranian-backed terror armies require civilian and social ecosystems to recruit from and to embed their offensive capabilities under civilian disguises. Hezbollah exploits international media to legitimize its operations through information warfare, utilizing journalists who fail to report on the IDF's unprecedented efforts, including calls and text messages, to limit harm to noncombatants, or to shed light adequately on Hezbollah's cynical human shielding modus operandi.

The intense military pressure is generating rapid strategic effects.

The ground operation has triggered a massive demographic shift in southern Lebanon, with over 600,000 Shiite residents evacuating the area following military warnings. The terror group is now forced to alter its deployment patterns, including a withdrawal from its stronghold of Dahieh in southern Beirut, spreading into northern Beirut and into mixed neighborhoods, expanding the risk to other sects within Lebanon.

Concurrently, the Lebanese government has publicly acknowledged that Hezbollah and Iran are the cause of the war and expressed a desire to negotiate directly with Israel. This development damages Hezbollah's legitimacy as the self-proclaimed "defender of Lebanon," positioning the group instead as an Iranian occupying force.  

Photo Credit: Israel Defense Forces

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Yaakov Lappin is an In-House Analyst at The MirYam Institute and an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. Read full bio here.

OP-ED: THE IRAN MOMENT: DEAL OR STRIKE?

By John Spencer

The United States and Iran are no longer in a cycle of routine diplomatic maneuvering. They are in a collision phase.

The recent round of indirect talks in Geneva did not reduce that reality. If anything, they clarified it. Diplomacy remains formally alive, but the military architecture surrounding it now defines the strategic environment more than the negotiating table.

The United States has surged two carrier strike groups into the region. The USS Gerald R. Ford is heading toward U.S. Central Command, joining the USS Abraham Lincoln already operating there. With them come guided missile destroyers, submarines, and layered air and missile defense assets. Carriers are flying continuous missions. This is not symbolic. It is coercive positioning.

Beyond the carriers, satellite imagery and open reporting show a significant airlift surge into the region, including C-17 transports, Patriot batteries, aerial refueling tankers, and supporting enablers. This is force flow at scale. It reflects preparation, not theater.

Just before and during the Geneva discussions, Tehran launched military drills in the Strait of Hormuz. The location was not incidental. Roughly one fifth of global oil flows transit that chokepoint. Iranian signaling there is strategic leverage, not theatrics. It reminds Washington and global markets that escalation carries economic risks.

This is the dual track. Talks in Europe. Warships at sea.

Yet Tehran’s behavior suggests it may not be fully internalizing the seriousness of the military posture it faces. Military drills in the Strait of Hormuz, continued missile signaling, and confident public rhetoric imply calculation rather than urgency. That may reflect negotiating tactics. It may also reflect miscalculation. The current U.S. force posture is not routine pressure. It is operational preparation. If Iranian leaders interpret it as symbolic leverage rather than credible strike positioning, the risk of escalation increases.

President Trump has made clear that a deal remains possible. He has also made clear that force remains on the table. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has described negotiations as difficult and uncertain. That pairing is deliberate. It is classic pressure diplomacy. Negotiate seriously or face the consequences.

The Geneva round produced language about “progress” and agreement on “guiding principles.” But U.S. officials have stated they expect detailed Iranian proposals within the next two weeks to bridge significant gaps between the two sides. That timeline matters. It suggests the hardest issues remain unresolved. The diplomatic track is not collapsing, but it is not closing the distance either. This is conditional progress under pressure, not a breakthrough.

What makes this moment different from previous rounds is the credibility of failure.

The last collapse in negotiations did not produce indefinite delay. It resulted in Israeli dominance in a 12-day conflict targeting critical elements of Iran’s nuclear and missile infrastructure, followed by U.S. Operation Midnight Hammer strikes on additional nuclear facilities. That precedent reshaped the negotiating environment. Tehran now negotiates knowing that Washington has demonstrated both capability and willingness to act. Washington negotiates knowing that Tehran will test resolve through proxies, missile threats, and maritime pressure rather than concede under coercion.

But this moment is not just about centrifuges.

Formally, the talks focus on the nuclear program. In reality, the strategic debate in Washington and Jerusalem is broader. Many argue that a nuclear only agreement is insufficient if Iran’s ballistic missile program continues to expand and if its regional proxy network remains intact. Others warn that broadening the agenda risks collapsing diplomacy entirely.

These are fundamentally different objectives.

A counter proliferation strike campaign would focus on enrichment facilities, weaponization research, and supporting infrastructure. A broader campaign would target missile production, command networks, and IRGC assets tied to regional proxy activity. A regime change effort would be something else entirely, with no modern precedent of clean success in comparable conditions.

Each path carries escalation risks. If the United States initiates strikes, Iran is unlikely to absorb them passively. Tehran would attempt to shape the battlespace immediately through missile and drone attacks against regional U.S. bases, proxy strikes, and efforts to disrupt maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. In such a scenario, U.S. naval forces operating in and around the Gulf would become primary targets, both to deter follow-on strikes and to demonstrate that Iran can impose costs if its territory is attacked. The Strait would not simply be a bargaining chip. It would become an active theater. Escalation would not be abstract. It would be kinetic and regional.

Even as Tehran engages in diplomacy, it retains the capability and demonstrated willingness to strike Israel directly. In 2024 and 2025, Iran launched large scale missile and drone attacks against Israel, testing air defenses and signaling that it is prepared to escalate beyond proxy warfare when it calculates that its interests are threatened. That reality does not disappear because negotiations are U.S. led. Israel remains within range of Iran’s expanding missile inventory. Any strike on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure could trigger another direct missile campaign against Israeli cities and military sites.

This risk is central to Israeli decision making. Israel views an Iranian nuclear capability paired with ballistic missiles and proxy support not as a strategic inconvenience but as an existential threat. Israeli leadership has consistently signaled that it reserves freedom of action if diplomacy fails to impose meaningful and verifiable limits.

At the same time, the internal dimension inside Iran cannot be ignored.

The regime is under profound economic strain. Years of sanctions, corruption, and structural mismanagement have hollowed out state capacity. Inflation remains punishing. The currency has repeatedly collapsed. Youth unemployment is widespread. Basic services have faltered. Water shortages in Tehran and other major cities have triggered emergency measures and protests. Power outages and infrastructure failures are common. A regime that struggles to provide water and electricity to its capital faces a crisis of governance, not just a diplomatic standoff.

Overlay that with prolonged unrest and violent crackdowns over the past year. Human rights organizations and opposition monitoring groups report that thousands of protesters have been killed and tens of thousands arrested. Many remain imprisoned. Some face death sentences following regime directed expedited judicial proceedings. While precise figures vary and independent verification is limited due to restrictions inside Iran, the scale and severity of repression are not in dispute.

Support for the Iranian people is not a moral side issue. It is a strategic variable. Any U.S. approach that focuses solely on centrifuges and missile counts while ignoring the regime’s treatment of its own citizens misreads the durability of the state itself. The legitimacy gap inside Iran is widening. Economic collapse, governance failure, and mass imprisonment are not peripheral issues. They are central to the long-term stability of the regime.

Domestic fragility does not automatically produce moderation. Often it produces defiance. Leaders under internal pressure can seek relief through compromise or attempt to demonstrate strength externally, including against Israel.

American interests are more layered. The United States must prevent nuclear proliferation, protect deployed forces, maintain regional deterrence, and avoid a broader war that would destabilize energy markets and global security. Credibility also matters. Red lines declared and unenforced erode deterrence beyond the Middle East. At the same time, American policy must clearly distinguish between the Iranian regime and the Iranian people.

So where does this leave us after Geneva?

At an inflection point measured in weeks, not months.

If Iran delivers detailed proposals that meaningfully extend breakout timelines and allow intrusive, verifiable monitoring, a historic deal remains possible. That would reshape the regional environment and reduce immediate strike risk.

If Iran stalls, hedges, or insists on narrow concessions while continuing enrichment and missile expansion, the logic of coercive buildup points in one direction. Force.

The presence of two carrier strike groups, layered missile defense, sustained air operations, and large-scale strategic airlift is not routine positioning. It is preparatory capability.

This is no longer a slow burn negotiation cycle. It is a narrowing decision window.

Something significant is coming. Either a diplomatic breakthrough backed by concrete commitments, or a military decision triggered by their absence. And if that strike occurs, the immediate risk is not only Iranian retaliation against U.S. forces, but another direct missile campaign against Israel.

The world is not waiting on another press conference from Geneva.

It is watching the carriers move.

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John Spencer, The MirYam Institute Senior Analyst On Urban & Asymmetrical Warfare. He is considered one of the world’s leading urban warfare experts and has conducted extensive on the ground research in Israel and Gaza since October 7th, 2023.   Read full bio here.

Photo Credit: Shutterstock: Dilok Klaisataporn

OP-ED: IN GAZA, THINK KOSOVO, NOT LEBANON

By John Spencer

The United States has reportedly circulated a draft resolution to the United Nations Security Council proposing the establishment of an international enforcement force in Gaza. The goal: deploy boots on the ground by January 2026, with a mandate of at least two years.

According to the draft, the proposed International Security Force (ISF) would “stabilize the security environment in Gaza by ensuring the process of demilitarizing the Gaza Strip, including the destruction and prevention of rebuilding of military, terror and offensive infrastructure, as well as the permanent decommissioning of weapons from non-state armed groups.”

Crucially, the draft empowers the force “to use all necessary measures to carry out its mandate consistent with international law.” That clause matters. Too many international deployments have entered war zones with vague missions and no authority. If this mission is to succeed, it must learn from history. When it comes to post-war stabilization, there are two memorable models: Lebanon and Kosovo. One failed. One worked.

The Failure: Lebanon

When Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 1982 international forces arrived in a zone of war with a peacekeeping mission and little enforcement authority. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was never equipped or mandated to disarm the militia that later evolved into Hezbollah. Over decades Hezbollah entrenched itself across southern Lebanon and built formidable capabilities, even within sight of UN positions.

UNIFIL’s weakness was its mandate. It could monitor but not prevent, record but not eliminate. It became a spectator in a conflict, a peacekeeping mission without peace to keep.

If the international community sends another symbolic force into Gaza, one that observes but does not enforce, it will replicate the same failure. Peace cannot be preserved where it has never been imposed.

The Success: Kosovo

There is a better precedent. In 1999, following NATO’s air campaign that ended Serbia’s ethnic cleansing of Albanian Kosovars, the United Nations authorized the Kosovo Force (KFOR), operating under NATO command with a UN mandate through Security Council Resolution 1244. Approximately 50,000 troops were deployed, drawn from NATO members including the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Canada, along with non-NATO partners such as Finland, Sweden, and Austria. KFOR’s mandate was to enforce the withdrawal of Serbian forces, disarm militant groups, secure borders, and support post-conflict stabilization in coordination with the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Its tasks included maintaining security and public order, controlling borders, interdicting weapons smuggling, implementing a province-wide weapons amnesty and destruction program, assisting reconstruction and de-mining, and supporting the establishment of civilian institutions, law enforcement, and judicial systems.

It succeeded because it had three things Lebanon never did: a robust mandate and a corresponding commitment. Two decades later it still maintains a presence. Its staying power, paired with a clear mission, kept the peace.

Similar patterns appeared in Bosnia and Herzegovina after 1995, and in East Timor in 1999, where multinational forces under UN mandate disarmed fighting factions, rebuilt institutions, and transitioned security and governance responsibilities to local authorities. These examples show that post-war success depends on credible power, sustained presence, and integration of security, governance, and reconstruction, not wishful diplomacy.

A Coalition with Teeth

The proposed Gaza force has the potential to follow that model. The United States has already deployed about 200 troops to support the cease-fire phase, while countries including Egypt, Turkey, Indonesia, the UAE and others have signaled interest in contributing troops or trainers. Israel’s participation will be essential for legitimacy and operational security. The key will be this force’s mandate; it must enable troops to act, not just observe. The phrase “all necessary measures” is encouraging. It suggests recognition that Gaza needs peace enforcement, not passive peacekeeping.

The draft resolution also envisions a transitional governance body in Gaza—a “Board of Peace” that would administer the territory until the Palestinian Authority demonstrates reform and is approved by the board. In effect, local governance will be conditional on performance, not automatic. That’s a major shift from past approaches. For years, the international community treated Palestinian governance as a question of politics. This plan reframes it as a question of capability and accountability. Reform, legitimacy and rejection of terror must precede authority.

For the Gaza mission to succeed, it needs three guiding principles:

1. Enforcement authority: The mission must have the legal and operational ability to compel demilitarization if armed groups refuse. Without that, it will share UNIFIL’s fate.

2. Accountability for reconstruction: Aid and materials must be tied to verified disarmament and must not be diverted to re-arming. No aid without oversight.

3. Integration with legitimate local partners: A new Palestinian police force must be properly vetted, trained, and mentored under international supervision over an extended timeline. In Kosovo and Bosnia, international advisors lived and worked alongside local police recruits for years, embedding legitimacy and professionalism. Gaza needs the same embedded approach.

Equally important is the narrative. Militants like Hamas built power not only through arms but through propaganda, control of education and distortion of history. Israel and its partners must now reclaim that space by showing that what is happening in Gaza is liberation from militant rule, not occupation. The most credible narrative will be visible results: security, opportunity and respect for civilians.

Recent history gives two paths. Lebanon’s UNIFIL failed because the international community lacked authority, clear principles, and commitment. Kosovo succeeded because it had all three. Gaza now stands at that same crossroads. The United States has circulated what appears to be the most promising framework yet for moving past war in Gaza. But success will hinge on whether the mission is prepared to enforce peace, not merely observe it. If Israel and its partners synchronize security, governance, and reconstruction, and commit to staying the course, parts of Gaza could become models for stabilization after Hamas rule, bubbles of success that expand outward over time. If not, Gaza risks becoming southern Lebanon all over again: a launchpad for the next war.

The world cannot afford that outcome. In Gaza, think Kosovo, not Lebanon.

Photo Credit: Israel Defense Forces

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John Spencer, The MirYam Institute Senior Analyst On Urban & Asymmetrical Warfare. He is considered one of the world’s leading urban warfare experts and has conducted extensive on the ground research in Israel and Gaza since October 7th.   Read full bio here.

GOVERNOR OF GEORGIA HOSTS HOSTAGE BROTHER ILAY DAVID AT STATE CAPITOL

THE MIRYAM INSTITUTE
ADOPT-A-HOSTAGE CAMPAIGN

The Honorable Brian And Marty Kemp
Governor & First Lady Of The State Of Georgia
Host Public Press Briefing In Solidarity With 
Evyatar David
Israeli Hostage Held In Hamas Captivity.

This Briefing Features:

• Opening Remarks By Mr. Bart Cohen & Ms. Eden Doniger, Esq.

• Statement Of Solidarity By Governor Kemp

• Call To Action By Ilay David, Brother Of Evyatar David.

On Thursday, July 10th, Governor Brian Kemp & First Lady Marty Kemp hosted a public press briefing at the State Capitol in support of hostage Evyatar David and all of the hostages still held in Hamas captivity. 

The MirYam Institute Adopt-A-Hostage campaign wishes to express profound thanks to the Governor and First Lady for their commitment to the release of Israel's hostages. 

We also applaud and distinguish Mr. Bart Cohen, Mr. Aaron Diamant and Ms. Eden Doniger, Esq., for their volunteer leadership and for bringing this important briefing to fruition. 

We are particularly grateful to Rozita Pnini, Co-Founder of The MirYam Institute, for her leadership and tireless organizational efforts on behalf of all the hostages and the David family.

Evyatar David, was abducted by Hamas during the October 7 Nova music festival. He has been held hostage for over 648 days.

Watch. Listen. Like. Share. Subscribe. Comment.

Photo Credit: Governor Brian Kemp Office © All Rights Reserved

THE UNSPOKEN PERILS OF THE HOSTAGE RELEASE DEAL

The unspoken perils of the hostage release deal-opinion

By Benjamin Anthony

JANUARY 23, 2024

Throughout the Israelites’ journey from captivity to redemption, the water in the Nile was turned into blood - but only once. The plague of locusts was cast - but only once. The parting of the Red Sea occurred - but only once. By their very nature, miracles tend to be unique.

This past Sunday, the world witnessed another miracle - one that Israel’s leaders should never assume will be repeated. In the heart of the Gaza Strip, walking from one Red Cross vehicle to the other, three young Israeli women; Romi Gonen (24), Emily Damari (28), and Doron Steinbrecher (31), undertook and completed a perilous march for their freedom, surrounded by thousands of Gazans. 

All three women have now been reunited with their families. Surviving such a journey was far from assured.

While Israelis rightly wrestle with the implications of the hostage-release deal, Israel’s leadership must urgently improve the machinations of the agreement to which they have signed on.

Four more women are mooted to be released this Saturday and Israel has but a few days to safeguard them from having to straddle similar, unfathomable danger.

The sole partition between Sunday’s returning hostages and the broader throngs of Palestinian-Arabs who had flocked to the site of their convoy, was a one-man-deep picket-line of gun-toting, black and green clad Hamas terrorists who, if the mob had decided to swarm the released hostages, would have been woefully outnumbered and ill-equipped to fend them off, assuming, that is, that they would have wished to do so. 

Had the crowd ridden a whim to attack, those three hostages, having endured and survived captivity for so very long, may well have met their end in a slaughter by the masses.

What they were required to negotiate rendered a march through a literal minefield a mundane and unremarkable journey by comparison. 

Israel’s leadership and defense establishment must do better. 

Consider that it is from among those same Gazan crowds that Hamas is actively, regularly and swiftly recruiting. Within those same Gazan crowds are the people who cheered by their thousands as the bodies of dead Israelis, murdered on October 7th, were paraded through the streets of their cities. It is those same Gazan people who when last granted the right to vote for their leadership, voted for Hamas and proclaim their readiness to do so again. They voted for terror, knowing that at the core of the Hamas charter a genocidal mandate for the murder of all Jews was enshrined, thus endorsing murder by the ballot papers they cast.

After October 7th, Israel's leadership claims to have internalized the lesson that the Gazans must never again be permitted to approach Israel’s borders. If so, nor must the Gazans be so proximate to Israel’s hostages during future releases. 

If Israel permits the recurrence of such a scene, it will be outsourcing the safety and security of the very captives it failed to protect on October 7th, to a terrorist organization sworn to the destruction of all Jews - criminally so!   

This ceasefire agreement has thrust the Jewish people into a most macabre lottery. For the first forty-two stomach churning days of the deal, the identity, status and timing of those scheduled for release will be known only hours before the captives are returned. 

Israel's leadership must not add to the collective national anguish by permitting such scenes of utter vulnerability and danger to be repeated; lest the Gazans decide to escalate from a scene of chaos, to a scene of murder, dismemberment and unimaginable horror.  

Israel’s leadership should recall that the Gazans, heading to the north of the Strip as they now are, are confronting scenes of unimaginable - and wholly justified - destruction, brought about as a consequence of their decisions and the actions of the leadership they elected. In the coming days, assuming the deal holds, those same Gazans will be looking on as Hamas releases not civilian women, but Israel’s "men of age" (males aged 18-50 categorized by Hamas as technical "enemy combatants" by dint of age and gender), and female soldiers of the IDF.

The surrounding masses are liable to assess the dystopian scenes that surround them and draw a direct, short nexus of culpability and vengeance between those and the Israeli ‘combatants’ being released. If again allowed to come within touching distance of Israel’s captives, the lives of the abductees will be in utter jeopardy. 

An enfeebled Hamas cannot be trusted to safeguard the hostages in the face of a baying crowd. Israel’s leaders must do more to secure them.

The sights of the hostages being flanked by terrorists and frog-marched into Gaza remain among the most chilling memories of this war. But even those would be outstripped were the world to witness the massacre of hostages on their journey toward freedom.

This generation of captives - so tragically forsaken on the seventh of October - must not be led to the very lip of their liberation, only to be engulfed by the sea of Human hatred with which so much of Gaza is awash.

The Israelites’ journey from captivity to redemption required the crossing of the seemingly uncrossable. Three Israeli women made a similar, miraculous crossing this past Sunday; but only the most foolish among us would wager that the miracle of this past Sunday will reoccur this weekend. Miracles do happen - but usually, only once.

The writer is a co-founder and CEO of The MirYam Institute and an IDF combat veteran.

Photo Credit: The Sun Newspaper

POLICY MEMO: ISRAEL MUST DITCH THE POLICY OF DETERRENCE

The need for a fundamental shift in Israeli national security strategy has become increasingly clear following the devastating mass murder attack launched by Hamas on southern Israel on October 7.

The traditional reliance on deterrence, a cornerstone of Israel’s security doctrine, has proven to be an entirely irrelevant concept against the unique threats posed by jihadist organizations.

While defense officials habitually would describe Israeli deterrence in the eyes of its adversaries as a ‘slippery’ and unstable ‘thing’ to measure, a closer examination reveals that it did not exist in the first place vis-à-vis Hamas, or Hezbollah. While these terror armies are certainly capable of calculating their interests and choosing timings that suit their ideological objectives, at no point did they exhibit actual deterrence – a wish to avoid conflict with Israel based on the conclusion that this is not in their interest.

This necessitates a strategic pivot towards a relentless focus on degrading enemy capabilities, and preventing the formation of jihadist armies on Israel’s borders, rather than engaging in fruitless and often unfounded efforts to get into the minds of adversaries whose cultural, religious, and military mindsets and actions are entirely alien to Western decision-making.

As such, one of the key policy lessons going forward needs to be the shift away from the doomed attempt to decipher the intentions of Middle Eastern terror armies, and towards placing the focus on continually degrading their capabilities, to the point where they are no longer organized hierarchical armies in control of their own territory and able to build up force with impunity.

The concept of deterrence, deeply ingrained in Israel’s defense strategy, is predicated on the belief that potential adversaries can be dissuaded from attacking by the threat of overwhelming retaliation, in a manner that would make the cost far outweigh the benefit. However, since jihadist armies will invariably unleash their capabilities at a time that is opportunistically convenient for advancing their totalitarian goals, the concept of deterrence should be discredited in dealing with these actors.

Traditionally, Israel’s classic ‘security triad’ concept, better known as the Ben Gurion doctrine, formulated in the 1950s, was based on the three pillars of deterrence; two of which were early intelligence warning of enemy intentions to attack, and decisive victory when wars broke out. The concept was based on Israel’s lack of strategic depth and relatively small standing army, as well as its rapid ability to call up reserves and take the fight into enemy territory.  Since lengthy conflicts drained Israel’s limited resources, the thinking went, deterrence was a valuable tool to build periods of calm in between rounds of warfare.

In fact, the concept proved relatively successful throughout the decades in which Israel faced state enemies with classical military threats, and Israel did indeed experience significant periods of relative calm and development between wars. But even in the 20th century, deterrence was far from a scientific concept. For example, soon after Israel’s most successful war, the 1967 Six Day War, Egypt, Jordan, and the PLO began a three-year bloody war of attrition against Israel.

The concept of deterrence was also predicated on the assumption that due to its size and resource limitations, Israel was in no position to permanently dismantle the military capabilities of its enemies, but rather, to use wars to land very painful blows, which would ‘top up’ deterrence until the next war.

However,  while the concept had mixed results in the 20th century, in the 21st century, the application of this thinking to jihadist enemy forces has proven disastrous. It allowed Hamas to build up a full-blown Iranian-backed army, whose October 7 mass murder attack will leave a multi-generational trauma on the Israeli national psyche, a setback to the Zionist ethos that Israel can never again afford to absorb.  

When dealing with religious jihadist adversaries, who are impervious to Western cost-benefit calculations, only persistent, sustained degradation of capabilities will lead to results. This approach involves continuous and proactive measures to weaken the operational and logistical capabilities of entities like Hamas, Hezbollah, and the puppet string holder that activates these proxies, the Iranian IRGC.

While non-state terror armies were never subject to deterrence, the question of whether the Islamic Republic of Iran can be deterred is more complex, and deserving of a separate analysis. Essentially, the Iranian regime and its main power brokers, the ayatollahs and the IRGC elite military officers, share the same fanatical jihadist ideology as their proxies, but are interested in handing off as much of the military conflict missions to proxies as they can at this time, until Iran goes nuclear. 

Closer to home, when seen through the lens of capability degradation rather than deterrence, it becomes clear that Israel’s war of self-defense against Hamas must end with the destruction of its status as a terrorist-army – a goal that Israel is past 70% of the way to reaching. This would be the first time in Israel’s military history that it would commit itself to permanently dismantling enemy capabilities, although smaller-scale precedents for this already exist, such as Israel’s dismantling of the PLO in Lebanon, and its five-year counter-terror offensive in the West Bank, which began in 2002.

This definition of victory does not rely on topping up deterrence, since the concept is irrelevant for Islamist decision-makers whose value systems and worldview stray far beyond what Western logic is capable of perceiving.

Israel’s focus must shift towards continuous military pressure and the strategic control of key areas to prevent enemy reorganization and resupply. This means Israel cannot, in the foreseeable future, give up control of the Philadelphi Corridor between Gaza and Egypt – a major tunnel network smuggling zone. Israeli control over the Netzarim Corridor separating northern Gaza from the rest of the Strip is also critical to preventing a resurgence of enemy capabilities that would threaten the western Negev and beyond.

Furthermore, the civilian aspect of terror armies like Hamas cannot be ignored. The civilian social dimension of Hamas and Hezbollah act as supporting elements for the formation of terror armies, and in Gaza’s case, Israel must quickly define civilian alternatives to Hamas’s regime as a result.

Ultimately, only a relentless focus on degrading enemy capabilities, coupled with strategic military freedom of maneuver in areas bordering Israel, based on precise intelligence, and a commitment to developing civilian alternatives to replace Islamist social-political frameworks that sprout terror armies, will be essential to Israel’s continuity in the Middle East.

To address the regional challenges of the 21st century, we must replace the discredited concept of deterrence with a proactive, capabilities-focused strategy.

Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

Jerusalem Post OP-ED: Egypt must reap what it sowed to prevent another October 7th

Egypt must reap what they sowed to prevent another October 7 from happening - opinion

By BENJAMIN ANTHONY

FEBRUARY 18, 2024 01:16

Updated: FEBRUARY 18, 2024 15:09

Following Israel’s rescue mission of two hostages carried out in Rafah, the IDF is poised to launch a ground incursion into the same city. Rafah is Hamas’s last remaining stronghold; it must be purged from that area for Israel to realize its war aims. 

Preventing a repeat of the horrors of October 7 will require Israel to maintain control of the Rafah crossing in perpetuity. 

If ordered, the IDF will operate in an area where approximately 1.2 million Gazans are currently located. They are there as a result of Israel’s largely successful efforts to move Gazans out of harm’s way as the IDF battles a brutal enemy.

Egypt's responsibility 

Gazans are hemmed in between Israel’s military offensive in Khan Yunis and Egypt, whose president refuses to allow the Gazan population into the Sinai Peninsula, the huge land expanse that abuts the Gaza Strip. 

Egypt bears massive responsibility for the unfolding crisis. For years, it turned a blind eye to the smuggling of personnel, material, and terrorist know-how into Gaza through Sinai.

It is from Egyptian territory, via Sinai, that terrorists returned to Gaza after undergoing military training in Syria, Iraq, and Iran. October 7 happened when the seeping complicity of Egypt burst forth in the bloodiest rampage against Jews since the Holocaust. 

Egypt now invokes the potential for regional upheaval to demand that the IDF not operate in Rafah. Having failed to uphold its obligations in territory over which it is sovereign, Egypt now seeks to dictate the terms of activities in areas over which it has no sovereignty.

If only Egypt had been as judicious in the past in preventing what crossed from Sinai into Gaza as it now is about what crosses from Gaza into Sinai. Jordan, the UAE, France, and Britain are echoing Egypt’s demands. Where does the hypocrisy end?

The international community typically reacts to displaced populations with the inventiveness of a middling pugilist. Their diplomatic one-two leads with a call for neighboring and non-neighboring countries to accept them as refugees and then follows up by championing the countries that do so. 

Egypt's refusal to accept Gazan refugees

SINCE THE beginning of the Syrian civil war, bordering Turkey is estimated to have absorbed more than 3.5 million Syrians. Non-bordering Germany accepted 1.2 million Syrians. Both countries were implored to do so and applauded thereafter.

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, responsibility for absorbing displaced Ukrainians again fell upon bordering states, including Poland, and non-bordering countries, such as Britain, America, and Israel. Again, the international community implored those countries to do so and applauded them thereafter. The old one-two. 

But in a move away from international norms, the countries that typically urge population absorption now assign no absorption responsibility to Egypt and insist that where other displaced populations may seek to emigrate, no such notion has ever crossed the minds of the Gazans.

Not only has Egypt refused to open its border, but it has deployed some 40 tanks to the area, presumably in readiness to gun down any of the Gazans whom it and the world claim to care for so deeply in the event that they cross into its territory.

Shifting to an unorthodox stance, the international community is now violating its own standards because this war features an unfamiliar regional contender – an Israel that is actually seeking a conclusive victory!

Desperate to prevent that outcome, the world now flails to tie Israel up using techniques of astounding illogic. They assert that Syrians may want to flee their brutal reality. So might Ukrainians. But Palestinians? No! Uniquely, Palestinians want to stay where they are, immiserated by the Hamas regime that they voted into power, displaced by Israel’s legitimate response to the attack launched against it. 

Some 250,000 Israelis have been driven from their homes by Iranian-backed Hezbollah and Iranian-backed Hamas in Gaza. In the latter case, Egypt was the bridge that connected murderous intent with murderous deeds.

Israel must advance. Asked to choose between a displacement crisis in Gaza or perpetuating the worsening displacement crisis unfolding within its own borders, it must first safely repatriate Israelis who are living as evacuees within their own country, beginning with those from Israel’s south. For that to be achieved, Hamas can and must be cleared from Rafah.

WHILE EGYPT is centrally responsible for the displacement of the Gazans and eminently equipped to resolve the issue, primary responsibility rests with the Gazan people themselves. 

Many distinctions exist between the crises in Syria and Ukraine and the events taking place in Gaza. The most telling of those is that while Syrians did not elect President Bashar Al-Assad and Ukrainians did not elect President Vladimir Putin, Gazan voters willfully cast their ballot in support of the regime that launched the war in which they are now entangled – Hamas!

Gazans lent an electoral mandate to the known genocidal intentions that are at the heart of the Hamas charter. That genocide was attempted on October 7. When dead IDF soldiers and elderly abductees were dragged into Gaza, mass civilian celebration erupted on the streets. Jew hatred, violence, and murderous intent still coarse through the veins of too many Gazans. Now Israel is responding. 

For too long, the cooperation between Egypt and Hamas has remained hidden; whispered about but rarely spoken aloud.

The future of Egypt and Hamas

But it’s time for their partnership to be outed. Whether Gazans and Egyptians want each other or not, the international community should consummate a union between them. Egypt should be pressed to allow Gazans into the Sinai - against its preference - with at least the same vigor that Israel was compelled to funnel aid into the Strip against the Israeli will. The result should also be the same. 

Israel must press forward, undeterred by bluster, in pursuit of its highest calling - the defense of its own people and the return of its hostages.

Israelis were murdered and abducted during the holiest, most festive period of the Jewish calendar. If it does not protect that which is sacred to it, others will trample upon and desecrate those values. Perhaps an IDF armed with the determination exhibited to this point can return the children of Israel to their homes in time for this year’s Passover. They’ve been in the wilderness of displacement, torment, and kidnap for far too long.

The writer is a co-founder and CEO of The MirYam Institute and an IDF combat veteran.