By John Spencer
The United States has reportedly circulated a draft resolution to the United Nations Security Council proposing the establishment of an international enforcement force in Gaza. The goal: deploy boots on the ground by January 2026, with a mandate of at least two years.
According to the draft, the proposed International Security Force (ISF) would “stabilize the security environment in Gaza by ensuring the process of demilitarizing the Gaza Strip, including the destruction and prevention of rebuilding of military, terror and offensive infrastructure, as well as the permanent decommissioning of weapons from non-state armed groups.”
Crucially, the draft empowers the force “to use all necessary measures to carry out its mandate consistent with international law.” That clause matters. Too many international deployments have entered war zones with vague missions and no authority. If this mission is to succeed, it must learn from history. When it comes to post-war stabilization, there are two memorable models: Lebanon and Kosovo. One failed. One worked.
The Failure: Lebanon
When Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 1982 international forces arrived in a zone of war with a peacekeeping mission and little enforcement authority. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was never equipped or mandated to disarm the militia that later evolved into Hezbollah. Over decades Hezbollah entrenched itself across southern Lebanon and built formidable capabilities, even within sight of UN positions.
UNIFIL’s weakness was its mandate. It could monitor but not prevent, record but not eliminate. It became a spectator in a conflict, a peacekeeping mission without peace to keep.
If the international community sends another symbolic force into Gaza, one that observes but does not enforce, it will replicate the same failure. Peace cannot be preserved where it has never been imposed.
The Success: Kosovo
There is a better precedent. In 1999, following NATO’s air campaign that ended Serbia’s ethnic cleansing of Albanian Kosovars, the United Nations authorized the Kosovo Force (KFOR), operating under NATO command with a UN mandate through Security Council Resolution 1244. Approximately 50,000 troops were deployed, drawn from NATO members including the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Canada, along with non-NATO partners such as Finland, Sweden, and Austria. KFOR’s mandate was to enforce the withdrawal of Serbian forces, disarm militant groups, secure borders, and support post-conflict stabilization in coordination with the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Its tasks included maintaining security and public order, controlling borders, interdicting weapons smuggling, implementing a province-wide weapons amnesty and destruction program, assisting reconstruction and de-mining, and supporting the establishment of civilian institutions, law enforcement, and judicial systems.
It succeeded because it had three things Lebanon never did: a robust mandate and a corresponding commitment. Two decades later it still maintains a presence. Its staying power, paired with a clear mission, kept the peace.
Similar patterns appeared in Bosnia and Herzegovina after 1995, and in East Timor in 1999, where multinational forces under UN mandate disarmed fighting factions, rebuilt institutions, and transitioned security and governance responsibilities to local authorities. These examples show that post-war success depends on credible power, sustained presence, and integration of security, governance, and reconstruction, not wishful diplomacy.
A Coalition with Teeth
The proposed Gaza force has the potential to follow that model. The United States has already deployed about 200 troops to support the cease-fire phase, while countries including Egypt, Turkey, Indonesia, the UAE and others have signaled interest in contributing troops or trainers. Israel’s participation will be essential for legitimacy and operational security. The key will be this force’s mandate; it must enable troops to act, not just observe. The phrase “all necessary measures” is encouraging. It suggests recognition that Gaza needs peace enforcement, not passive peacekeeping.
The draft resolution also envisions a transitional governance body in Gaza—a “Board of Peace” that would administer the territory until the Palestinian Authority demonstrates reform and is approved by the board. In effect, local governance will be conditional on performance, not automatic. That’s a major shift from past approaches. For years, the international community treated Palestinian governance as a question of politics. This plan reframes it as a question of capability and accountability. Reform, legitimacy and rejection of terror must precede authority.
For the Gaza mission to succeed, it needs three guiding principles:
Enforcement authority: The mission must have the legal and operational ability to compel demilitarization if armed groups refuse. Without that, it will share UNIFIL’s fate.
Accountability for reconstruction: Aid and materials must be tied to verified disarmament and must not be diverted to re-arming. No aid without oversight.
Integration with legitimate local partners: A new Palestinian police force must be properly vetted, trained, and mentored under international supervision over an extended timeline. In Kosovo and Bosnia, international advisors lived and worked alongside local police recruits for years, embedding legitimacy and professionalism. Gaza needs the same embedded approach.
Equally important is the narrative. Militants like Hamas built power not only through arms but through propaganda, control of education and distortion of history. Israel and its partners must now reclaim that space by showing that what is happening in Gaza is liberation from militant rule, not occupation. The most credible narrative will be visible results: security, opportunity and respect for civilians.
Recent history gives two paths. Lebanon’s UNIFIL failed because the international community lacked authority, clear principles, and commitment. Kosovo succeeded because it had all three. Gaza now stands at that same crossroads. The United States has circulated what appears to be the most promising framework yet for moving past war in Gaza. But success will hinge on whether the mission is prepared to enforce peace, not merely observe it. If Israel and its partners synchronize security, governance, and reconstruction, and commit to staying the course, parts of Gaza could become models for stabilization after Hamas rule, bubbles of success that expand outward over time. If not, Gaza risks becoming southern Lebanon all over again: a launchpad for the next war.
The world cannot afford that outcome. In Gaza, think Kosovo, not Lebanon.
Photo Credit: Israel Defense Forces
John Spencer, The MirYam Institute Senior Analyst On Urban & Asymmetrical Warfare. He is considered one of the world’s leading urban warfare experts and has conducted extensive on the ground research in Isarel and Gaza since October 7th. Read full bio here.