MirYam’s Commentary
In this situational briefing, Benjamin Anthony is joined by leading military and geopolitical experts John Spencer, Yaakov Lappin, and Ruth Wasserman-Lande, as well as U.S. veteran, I-SAP alumnus and Congressional candidate, Micah Jones; all of whom sit down with him to examine the unfolding war between the United States and Israel, and the Iranian regime.
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Photo Credit: Image created using Gemini AI
The United States and Iran are no longer in a cycle of routine diplomatic maneuvering. They are in a collision phase.
The recent round of indirect talks in Geneva did not reduce that reality. If anything, they clarified it. Diplomacy remains formally alive, but the military architecture surrounding it now defines the strategic environment more than the negotiating table.
The United States has surged two carrier strike groups into the region. The USS Gerald R. Ford is heading toward U.S. Central Command, joining the USS Abraham Lincoln already operating there. With them come guided missile destroyers, submarines, and layered air and missile defense assets. Carriers are flying continuous missions. This is not symbolic. It is coercive positioning.
Beyond the carriers, satellite imagery and open reporting show a significant airlift surge into the region, including C-17 transports, Patriot batteries, aerial refueling tankers, and supporting enablers. This is force flow at scale. It reflects preparation, not theater.
Just before and during the Geneva discussions, Tehran launched military drills in the Strait of Hormuz. The location was not incidental. Roughly one fifth of global oil flows transit that chokepoint. Iranian signaling there is strategic leverage, not theatrics. It reminds Washington and global markets that escalation carries economic risks.
This is the dual track. Talks in Europe. Warships at sea.
Yet Tehran’s behavior suggests it may not be fully internalizing the seriousness of the military posture it faces. Military drills in the Strait of Hormuz, continued missile signaling, and confident public rhetoric imply calculation rather than urgency. That may reflect negotiating tactics. It may also reflect miscalculation. The current U.S. force posture is not routine pressure. It is operational preparation. If Iranian leaders interpret it as symbolic leverage rather than credible strike positioning, the risk of escalation increases.
President Trump has made clear that a deal remains possible. He has also made clear that force remains on the table. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has described negotiations as difficult and uncertain. That pairing is deliberate. It is classic pressure diplomacy. Negotiate seriously or face the consequences.
The Geneva round produced language about “progress” and agreement on “guiding principles.” But U.S. officials have stated they expect detailed Iranian proposals within the next two weeks to bridge significant gaps between the two sides. That timeline matters. It suggests the hardest issues remain unresolved. The diplomatic track is not collapsing, but it is not closing the distance either. This is conditional progress under pressure, not a breakthrough.
What makes this moment different from previous rounds is the credibility of failure.
The last collapse in negotiations did not produce indefinite delay. It resulted in Israeli dominance in a 12-day conflict targeting critical elements of Iran’s nuclear and missile infrastructure, followed by U.S. Operation Midnight Hammer strikes on additional nuclear facilities. That precedent reshaped the negotiating environment. Tehran now negotiates knowing that Washington has demonstrated both capability and willingness to act. Washington negotiates knowing that Tehran will test resolve through proxies, missile threats, and maritime pressure rather than concede under coercion.
But this moment is not just about centrifuges.
Formally, the talks focus on the nuclear program. In reality, the strategic debate in Washington and Jerusalem is broader. Many argue that a nuclear only agreement is insufficient if Iran’s ballistic missile program continues to expand and if its regional proxy network remains intact. Others warn that broadening the agenda risks collapsing diplomacy entirely.
These are fundamentally different objectives.
A counter proliferation strike campaign would focus on enrichment facilities, weaponization research, and supporting infrastructure. A broader campaign would target missile production, command networks, and IRGC assets tied to regional proxy activity. A regime change effort would be something else entirely, with no modern precedent of clean success in comparable conditions.
Each path carries escalation risks. If the United States initiates strikes, Iran is unlikely to absorb them passively. Tehran would attempt to shape the battlespace immediately through missile and drone attacks against regional U.S. bases, proxy strikes, and efforts to disrupt maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. In such a scenario, U.S. naval forces operating in and around the Gulf would become primary targets, both to deter follow-on strikes and to demonstrate that Iran can impose costs if its territory is attacked. The Strait would not simply be a bargaining chip. It would become an active theater. Escalation would not be abstract. It would be kinetic and regional.
Even as Tehran engages in diplomacy, it retains the capability and demonstrated willingness to strike Israel directly. In 2024 and 2025, Iran launched large scale missile and drone attacks against Israel, testing air defenses and signaling that it is prepared to escalate beyond proxy warfare when it calculates that its interests are threatened. That reality does not disappear because negotiations are U.S. led. Israel remains within range of Iran’s expanding missile inventory. Any strike on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure could trigger another direct missile campaign against Israeli cities and military sites.
This risk is central to Israeli decision making. Israel views an Iranian nuclear capability paired with ballistic missiles and proxy support not as a strategic inconvenience but as an existential threat. Israeli leadership has consistently signaled that it reserves freedom of action if diplomacy fails to impose meaningful and verifiable limits.
At the same time, the internal dimension inside Iran cannot be ignored.
The regime is under profound economic strain. Years of sanctions, corruption, and structural mismanagement have hollowed out state capacity. Inflation remains punishing. The currency has repeatedly collapsed. Youth unemployment is widespread. Basic services have faltered. Water shortages in Tehran and other major cities have triggered emergency measures and protests. Power outages and infrastructure failures are common. A regime that struggles to provide water and electricity to its capital faces a crisis of governance, not just a diplomatic standoff.
Overlay that with prolonged unrest and violent crackdowns over the past year. Human rights organizations and opposition monitoring groups report that thousands of protesters have been killed and tens of thousands arrested. Many remain imprisoned. Some face death sentences following regime directed expedited judicial proceedings. While precise figures vary and independent verification is limited due to restrictions inside Iran, the scale and severity of repression are not in dispute.
Support for the Iranian people is not a moral side issue. It is a strategic variable. Any U.S. approach that focuses solely on centrifuges and missile counts while ignoring the regime’s treatment of its own citizens misreads the durability of the state itself. The legitimacy gap inside Iran is widening. Economic collapse, governance failure, and mass imprisonment are not peripheral issues. They are central to the long-term stability of the regime.
Domestic fragility does not automatically produce moderation. Often it produces defiance. Leaders under internal pressure can seek relief through compromise or attempt to demonstrate strength externally, including against Israel.
American interests are more layered. The United States must prevent nuclear proliferation, protect deployed forces, maintain regional deterrence, and avoid a broader war that would destabilize energy markets and global security. Credibility also matters. Red lines declared and unenforced erode deterrence beyond the Middle East. At the same time, American policy must clearly distinguish between the Iranian regime and the Iranian people.
So where does this leave us after Geneva?
At an inflection point measured in weeks, not months.
If Iran delivers detailed proposals that meaningfully extend breakout timelines and allow intrusive, verifiable monitoring, a historic deal remains possible. That would reshape the regional environment and reduce immediate strike risk.
If Iran stalls, hedges, or insists on narrow concessions while continuing enrichment and missile expansion, the logic of coercive buildup points in one direction. Force.
The presence of two carrier strike groups, layered missile defense, sustained air operations, and large-scale strategic airlift is not routine positioning. It is preparatory capability.
This is no longer a slow burn negotiation cycle. It is a narrowing decision window.
Something significant is coming. Either a diplomatic breakthrough backed by concrete commitments, or a military decision triggered by their absence. And if that strike occurs, the immediate risk is not only Iranian retaliation against U.S. forces, but another direct missile campaign against Israel.
The world is not waiting on another press conference from Geneva.
It is watching the carriers move.
John Spencer, The MirYam Institute Senior Analyst On Urban & Asymmetrical Warfare. He is considered one of the world’s leading urban warfare experts and has conducted extensive on the ground research in Israel and Gaza since October 7th, 2023. Read full bio here.
Photo Credit: Shutterstock: Dilok Klaisataporn
In this episode, I sit down with MirYam Institute Urban Warfare Analyst, John Spencer to discuss the U.S. military buildup around Iran, as well as the Board Of Peace ceremony in Davos and the impact it may have on Israel’s ability to combat Hamas in Gaza.
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Photo Credit: NARA-Public Domain
In this episode of the show, I sit down with John Spencer. We’re proud to have brought John aboard as The MirYam Institute Senior Analyst On Urban & Asymmetrical Warfare.
A globally renowned expert, John delves into his recent position paper regarding the U.S. proposed International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza, the outline for which is currently moving through the United Nations (link to position paper below).
He and I discuss where he sees reason for optimism and for caution.
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Photo Credit: Israel Defense Forces
The United States has reportedly circulated a draft resolution to the United Nations Security Council proposing the establishment of an international enforcement force in Gaza. The goal: deploy boots on the ground by January 2026, with a mandate of at least two years.
According to the draft, the proposed International Security Force (ISF) would “stabilize the security environment in Gaza by ensuring the process of demilitarizing the Gaza Strip, including the destruction and prevention of rebuilding of military, terror and offensive infrastructure, as well as the permanent decommissioning of weapons from non-state armed groups.”
Crucially, the draft empowers the force “to use all necessary measures to carry out its mandate consistent with international law.” That clause matters. Too many international deployments have entered war zones with vague missions and no authority. If this mission is to succeed, it must learn from history. When it comes to post-war stabilization, there are two memorable models: Lebanon and Kosovo. One failed. One worked.
The Failure: Lebanon
When Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 1982 international forces arrived in a zone of war with a peacekeeping mission and little enforcement authority. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was never equipped or mandated to disarm the militia that later evolved into Hezbollah. Over decades Hezbollah entrenched itself across southern Lebanon and built formidable capabilities, even within sight of UN positions.
UNIFIL’s weakness was its mandate. It could monitor but not prevent, record but not eliminate. It became a spectator in a conflict, a peacekeeping mission without peace to keep.
If the international community sends another symbolic force into Gaza, one that observes but does not enforce, it will replicate the same failure. Peace cannot be preserved where it has never been imposed.
The Success: Kosovo
There is a better precedent. In 1999, following NATO’s air campaign that ended Serbia’s ethnic cleansing of Albanian Kosovars, the United Nations authorized the Kosovo Force (KFOR), operating under NATO command with a UN mandate through Security Council Resolution 1244. Approximately 50,000 troops were deployed, drawn from NATO members including the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Canada, along with non-NATO partners such as Finland, Sweden, and Austria. KFOR’s mandate was to enforce the withdrawal of Serbian forces, disarm militant groups, secure borders, and support post-conflict stabilization in coordination with the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Its tasks included maintaining security and public order, controlling borders, interdicting weapons smuggling, implementing a province-wide weapons amnesty and destruction program, assisting reconstruction and de-mining, and supporting the establishment of civilian institutions, law enforcement, and judicial systems.
It succeeded because it had three things Lebanon never did: a robust mandate and a corresponding commitment. Two decades later it still maintains a presence. Its staying power, paired with a clear mission, kept the peace.
Similar patterns appeared in Bosnia and Herzegovina after 1995, and in East Timor in 1999, where multinational forces under UN mandate disarmed fighting factions, rebuilt institutions, and transitioned security and governance responsibilities to local authorities. These examples show that post-war success depends on credible power, sustained presence, and integration of security, governance, and reconstruction, not wishful diplomacy.
A Coalition with Teeth
The proposed Gaza force has the potential to follow that model. The United States has already deployed about 200 troops to support the cease-fire phase, while countries including Egypt, Turkey, Indonesia, the UAE and others have signaled interest in contributing troops or trainers. Israel’s participation will be essential for legitimacy and operational security. The key will be this force’s mandate; it must enable troops to act, not just observe. The phrase “all necessary measures” is encouraging. It suggests recognition that Gaza needs peace enforcement, not passive peacekeeping.
The draft resolution also envisions a transitional governance body in Gaza—a “Board of Peace” that would administer the territory until the Palestinian Authority demonstrates reform and is approved by the board. In effect, local governance will be conditional on performance, not automatic. That’s a major shift from past approaches. For years, the international community treated Palestinian governance as a question of politics. This plan reframes it as a question of capability and accountability. Reform, legitimacy and rejection of terror must precede authority.
For the Gaza mission to succeed, it needs three guiding principles:
Enforcement authority: The mission must have the legal and operational ability to compel demilitarization if armed groups refuse. Without that, it will share UNIFIL’s fate.
Accountability for reconstruction: Aid and materials must be tied to verified disarmament and must not be diverted to re-arming. No aid without oversight.
Integration with legitimate local partners: A new Palestinian police force must be properly vetted, trained, and mentored under international supervision over an extended timeline. In Kosovo and Bosnia, international advisors lived and worked alongside local police recruits for years, embedding legitimacy and professionalism. Gaza needs the same embedded approach.
Equally important is the narrative. Militants like Hamas built power not only through arms but through propaganda, control of education and distortion of history. Israel and its partners must now reclaim that space by showing that what is happening in Gaza is liberation from militant rule, not occupation. The most credible narrative will be visible results: security, opportunity and respect for civilians.
Recent history gives two paths. Lebanon’s UNIFIL failed because the international community lacked authority, clear principles, and commitment. Kosovo succeeded because it had all three. Gaza now stands at that same crossroads. The United States has circulated what appears to be the most promising framework yet for moving past war in Gaza. But success will hinge on whether the mission is prepared to enforce peace, not merely observe it. If Israel and its partners synchronize security, governance, and reconstruction, and commit to staying the course, parts of Gaza could become models for stabilization after Hamas rule, bubbles of success that expand outward over time. If not, Gaza risks becoming southern Lebanon all over again: a launchpad for the next war.
The world cannot afford that outcome. In Gaza, think Kosovo, not Lebanon.
Photo Credit: Israel Defense Forces
John Spencer, The MirYam Institute Senior Analyst On Urban & Asymmetrical Warfare. He is considered one of the world’s leading urban warfare experts and has conducted extensive on the ground research in Israel and Gaza since October 7th. Read full bio here.
