By Chuck Freilich
As the prospects for a renewed nuclear deal with Iran fade, at least for now, the international and Israeli media have been replete with reports of Israel’s inability to destroy the Iranian nuclear program and ostensible lack of a military option. Various experts, including former and current Israeli officials, have all opined.
By framing the issue as the ability or inability to achieve a "knockout blow," one that puts an end to Iran's nuclear program, these reports miss the point. That would probably not be Israel's objective.
Up until around 2010, probably earlier, this might have still been possible, but Iran now has the necessary knowledge to reconstitute the program after an attack and even the U.S. can no longer simply put an end to it by military means. A successful attack could aspire today, at most, to achieve a significant delay, and even that is probably something that only the U.S. could do.
Given its more modest capabilities, Israel’s national security strategy has always focused on a combination of deterrence and limited military victories designed to play for time, in the hope that the problem of the hour would somehow resolve itself in the future. This strategy proved successful in the conventional wars against the Arab states in the early decades, and is still being put to the test in the repeated rounds of asymmetric warfare with Hezbollah and Hamas, in the more recent ones.
Rather than a long-term postponement of Iran’s nuclear program, an Israeli attack would likely have more limited ambitions. The objective would not be, as some have speculated, to draw the U.S. into a military conflict, but to gain additional time and to create a situation in which the international community, led by the U.S., would be constrained to finally take decisive diplomatic and economic measures, especially given the possibility of further Israeli action. For that, Israel's limited capabilities are more than sufficient.
Western media reports typically conclude, with little if any analytical substantiation, that an Israeli attack would lead to a regional conflagration. That is certainly a possibility that planners must take into account, but it is also a classic case of the worst possible scenario being portrayed as the most likely one.
Most Western journalists today lack familiarity with military thinking and recoil from it instinctually, without the expertise necessary to analyze the ramifications of an application of force in a given situation. This is not to commend military action as the preferred option – it is not – but analyses such as these must be based on expertise in military affairs and deep familiarity with the specific country and situation in question.
In practice, decades of experience with Iran suggest that its response would probably be much more narrowly focused than these reports suggest. To be sure, Iran would have to respond, but there is every reason to believe that the response would be directed primarily against Israel, via a massive Hezbollah attack.
This is precisely the scenario for which Iran built Hezbollah’s mammoth arsenal of some 150,000 rockets, numerous UAVs (drones) and other advanced capabilities. Israel’s home front will face a level of destruction such as it has never experienced before and Israel may even find itself in a multi-front war, not only against Hezbollah, but Iran itself, Iranian-affiliated forces in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, Hamas and more.
There is no denying that Iran may also launch limited attacks against American allies in the region (e.g. the Saudis) and even against some American-affiliated targets, whether U.S. forces in the region, or a U.S. embassy or McDonald’s somewhere in the world, if only to make it look good. Iran, too, has a self-image to maintain and domestic opinion to assuage.
abroad, especially since Iran would claim to be conducting what many would consider a justified response to Israeli "aggression."
Seven Israeli premiers (Rabin, Peres, Barak, Sharon, Olmert, Netanyahu and Bennett) have dreamed of an American military strike that would put an end to Iran’s nuclear program. Five American presidents (Clinton, Bush, Obama, Trump and Biden), Democrat and Republican alike, have refrained from doing so. Any realistic assessment today must conclude that this might change only in extraordinary and highly unlikely circumstances.
In reality, only a diplomatic agreement, even a flawed one, holds out the possibility of a long-term postponement of Iran’s nuclear program.
If and when the moment of truth comes, when all other options have been exhausted, Israel will likely find itself facing Iran alone. We have been there before: Facing the Iraqi and Syrian nuclear programs, among other critical occasions.
At that time, Israel will have no alternative but to launch a strike and let the pieces fall where they may. That is what the IDF is preparing for today. Bad as this option may be, allowing Iran to go nuclear would be intolerable.
Those who are totally averse to any risk of retaliation should, indeed, oppose military action. They should also prepare to live in a world in which Iran and other rogue states are essentially free to acquire nuclear weapons.
There is, however, little reason to believe that things will go beyond this limited escalation. In a situation in which Iran is already embroiled in a nearly all-out conflict with Israel and in which the latter is likely to strike regime and other strategic targets in Iran itself, logic and experience strongly suggest that Iran would want to put a lid on things.
Indeed, a true military confrontation with the U.S. would appear to be the last thing that Iran would want. Iran may be homicidal, but it is not suicidal, and it is painfully aware of the true balance of power.
A conflict limited primarily to Israel would be far more suited to Iran's size, capabilities and generally cautious temperament. It would also play better both at home, to Iran’s domestic audience, and
Professor Chuck Freilich, serves as Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science, Dept of Political Science at Columbia University. He is a former deputy national security adviser in Israel and long-time senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, has taught political science at Harvard, Columbia, NYU and Tel Aviv University. Read full bio here.