By Chuck Freilich
The United States is engaged in a fresh attempt to engage Iran diplomatically on a return to the 2015 nuclear deal – sparking a debate over what Israel's interests are going forward. The following is a Q & A with Prof. Chuck Freilich, a former Israeli national security adviser.
How do you view the Biden administration’s attempts to diplomatically engage Iran over its nuclear program?
While the debate on how to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear state is lengthy and complex, it is important to keep in mind that the only supreme objective is to indeed prevent Iran from going nuclear.
The how is less important than the what, and it is vital to keep the bottom line in sight.
Although the U.S. was probably out-negotiated when it, along with other world powers, signed the Joint Plan of Comprehensive Action (JCPOA) with Iran in 2015, the deal back then was, and remains, the least worst option in serving the overall objective of keeping Iran from becoming a nuclear-armed state.
Despite the fact that the Obama administration was more avid to reach an agreement than Iran was - the wrong way to negotiate - the 2015 agreement was ultimately a reasonable arrangement, which gave Israel ten to fifteen years of quiet. Israel has not gotten that many years of quiet on any major strategic issue.
The primary criticism of the JPOCA was the sunset clauses. The deal also failed to deal with Iran’s missile program or its regional expansionism, but the U.S.’s thinking focused on the goal of managing the nuclear issue – an existential issue for Israel and a critical one for the region – and then handling the other issues separately.
This is the right approach; it is one that was held by many, maybe most, Israeli defense and government officials for many years and still is.
Yet after the deal, Prime Minister Netanyahu attacked former President Barack Obama for years over it, in part because the the agreement failed to address the other Iranian issues. The Obama administration claimed that this was the best deal it could achieve, even if it was not the deal that it wanted.
What should Israel do going forward?
Netanyahu is not wrong to say that the Americans were somewhat out-negotiated. But that is no reason for Israel to now come out strongly against a new deal that the Biden administration is seeking with Iran. In fact, it would be a historic error to repeat that posture.
As it is, the American Democratic Left is furious at Israel, casting a shadow over Israel’s most important alliance. An ongoing collapse in support for Israel is occurring in the progressive side of the Democratic camp, and there is also a major decrease of support for Israel in the Jewish community.
Now, even more than in 2015, it would be a historic error to further alienate these camps. Israel should express its stances behind the scenes and engage in serious debate. But it must also present itself as the major ally of the U.S.
It seems likely that Biden has messaged the Israeli government, asking it for its position, and informing it that its views will be taken into account, but also issued a stern warning to not come after it like Netanyahu did to Obama.
The bilateral Israel – U.S. relationship is sufficiently troubled even without tensions over Iran. The Palestinian issue is again gaining attention and the deteriorating quality of Israel’s democracy is also coming under greater scrutiny.
To be sure, once President Trump decided to exit the nuclear agreement, an historic error, his decision to place Iran under a maximum pressure campaign deserved support. The problem is that he did not have a strategy for dealing with Iran beyond sanctions and it did not achieve its objectives in the three years that it was in effect. Perhaps it could have done so if given an extension, but Israel must face up to the new strategic situation that is taking shape.
What is the wider strategic framework for understanding the debate on how to stop Iran’s nuclear ambitions?
Biden is facing significant pressure from his party to conclude a deal with Iran and not to waste too much time and effort on the Islamic Republic, since the U.S. is interested in prioritizing its foreign policies on China and Russia.
For now, however, Iran is the most pressing foreign policy issue, and the Iranians placed themselves at the center of the agenda. The U.S. will have to decide whether to try to go back to the old 2015 deal or aim for an improved version of it.
Going back to the old arrangement means surrendering the good leverage provided to the Biden administration by Trump, in the form of sanctions. On the other hand, the two choices may well be returning to the old deal, or having no deal at all. If that turns out to be the case, it makes little sense to argue that Israel would be better off without any deal.
How would Israel have been able to take on Iranian entrenchment in Syria and its support for Hezbollah in Lebanon if Iran had gone nuclear in the meantime? The answer is that Israel would be facing a new existential threat, and tackling Iranian entrenchment would become severely more complex.
In a reality in which Iran is armed with nuclear weapons, Israel would have to think many times before it struck Iranian assets in Syria , or anywhere else, including in Iran itself. Even if the odds of a full nuclear escalation are very low, the results of such a scenario would be total devastation. Countries behave very differently under such circumstances.
It is fair to hope that the U.S. will not give up all of its leverage. One option is reaching an interim deal, in which neither side gives up everything. Iran could essentially come back into compliance and back off some of its violations, while the U.S. eases some sanctions. After the Iranian presidential elections occur in June, further negotiations on a more serious deal could resume.
For Israel, progress between the U.S. and Iran on a nuclear deal will allow it to focus on the vital mission of stopping Iran from creating a forward operating presence in Syria, or transferring significant quantities of precision weapons to Hezbollah. Israel must stop these activities at any cost, including going to war if this becomes necessary.
It is important to create the space and time for Israel to deal with the challenge of Iranian entrenchment. To stop Iran’s program of smuggling ballistic missiles and long-range drones to its terrorist proxies, and to further cement emerging relations with its new Sunni friends.
A new nuclear deal will facilitate this objective.
Professor Chuck Freilich, serves as Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science, Dept of Political Science at Columbia University. He is a former deputy national security adviser in Israel and long-time senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, has taught political science at Harvard, Columbia, NYU and Tel Aviv University. Read full bio here.