The Syrian Arena: New Actors, Developing Strategic Challenges

By Avishai Levi

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Russia's decision to solidify its long-term presence in Syria represents a serious challenge to Israel; strategic clarity and tactical caution are increasingly essential to meeting this challenge. 

In September 2015, when Russia began dispatching military forces to fight on behalf of the Assad regime, Israel quickly discovered it had a 'new neighbor' on its doorstep. Since that time, Moscow has continued to introduce powerful and dangerous assets to the region. This includes: Russian air squadrons, air defense batteries, naval assets, and ground units. One clear consequence of Russia's involvement is that the Damascus Alawite regime of Basher Assad is set to remain in power. 

Prior to 2015, Israel was familiar with the Russian-made military equipment being sold to the Syrian regime. Now, it must have a comprehensive knowledge and deep understanding of the technology that Moscow has moved into the Syrian arena.  Israel's level of knowledge in these matters will be tested in every encounter, whether in the air, at sea, or on the ground.

Jerusalem must pursue the crucial objective of building a positive relationship with a world power that has now established itself on its northern doorstep. Given the significant resources invested to date, it is clear that Russia intends to remain a central player in Syria. Israel's central challenge lies in translating the knowledge that Russia is here to stay into strategic policy. As a result, Israel must be up to speed on the full range of Russia's activities in Syria, including both the tactical and the higher-level policy formulated by President Vladimir Putin 

In addition to working to influence Russia's view of the region at the senior government level, Israel has created a direct military channel of coordination with Russia, with the express objective of preventing a conflict of forces. Presently, Jerusalem has multiple levels of ongoing and regular communications with Moscow. These include: civilian and government coordination channels, talks between the respective national security councils, and high-level military delegations.

The top goal for both countries is to prevent tactical mistakes and avoid unintended friction in the air over Syria and in the relevant sea area. This is possible so long as the policy of Russia remains to avert conflict. At the strategic level, this can be safeguarded by making it clear to Russia that the goal of Israel's campaign is not to harm the Assad regime, but rather to enforce red lines against Iranian entrenchment and weapons transfers to Hezbollah.

Furthermore, Israel needs to take extra caution as it pursues its campaign between wars with its low-profile series of operations designed to roll back Iranian entrenchment and weapons smuggling in Syria. Syria has become the playground of multiple foreign actors, and each one is having a significant impact on the ground. Just as Iran has used Syrian territory to manufacture weapons systems for Hezbollah, while also trying to create a land corridor into Syria from Iraq, so too has Russia's presence created a major signature in Syria. This includes the Khmeimim airbase operated by the Russian Air Force, and the Russian naval facility on the Syrian coastline, located at Tartus.  

Due to the complexity of the northern arena, the campaign between wars must be conducted strictly in line with those realities, and with great precision.

 

 AN INCRESINGLY CROWDED ARENA

In the Syria of 2020, the Israel Defense Forces might encounter Syrian regime forces, Iranian units, non-state armed actors like Hezbollah and Shi'ite militias, or Russian forces. All of these can be found in a single Syrian arena that once contained only the Syrian military. 

This means that the IDF must act with vigilance and determination to meet its stated objectives, while transmitting its intentions to Russia clearly and consistently. The Israel Air Force must be able to direct munitions with pinpoint precision, knowing the identity of the various forces on the ground at all times. Israel must also be able to send coordination messages whenever necessary. This set of actions is designed to prevent Russia from trying to disrupt Israel's activities, and to prevent Russia from misreading them. The more Israel's actions are coordinated and made clear to the Russian side, the greater the chances that Russia's policy towards Israel and its activities will not become disruptive.  

The goal is to avoid a situation in which Russia changes its policy towards Israel's campaign, a development that would seriously hamper Israel's freedom of maneuver. Furthermore, any scenario involving Russian air defense systems targeting IAF aircraft would create a major challenge.  The solution lies in creating prior understanding with Russia, and reiterating the purpose of Israel's activities, which always boil down to the same two missions: preventing Iranian military entrenchment and foiling weapons trafficking to Hezbollah. 

Israel has no desire to harm the Assad regime, regularly conveying messages that it will not target Syria, as long as Syrian air defense batteries do not fire on the IAF. Yet, Israel's red lines determine that it must act against anyone who does attempt to attack Israeli forces. Fortunately, Syria's newer air defense systems are developed enough to enable operators to know that Israel's planes are not threatening them. If, despite this knowledge, they still fire on Israeli aircraft, then the IAF cannot accept this situation, and it must act to defend itself. While the Assad regime wants to defend its skies, and show Israel that the IAF cannot operate freely over Syria, its decision to fire on Israeli jets has already cost it considerably in terms of lost assets. 

 

IRAN: BUILDING A LAND CORRIDOR FROM CRUMBLING IRAQ TO CRUMBLED SYRIA

Many of the Iranian activities that Israel has disrupted in recent years have been conducted under the command of Iranian Quds Force Commander, Qassem Soleimani, who was assassinated by a U.S. drone strike In January. Despite the assassination, Iran will likely continue with efforts to build a land corridor that connects the crumbling country of Iraq to the crumbled state of Syria. This would give Iran a new level of access to the crumbled state of Lebanon where its proxy, Hezbollah, is based, and to where Iran wants to move resources, weapons, and personnel via its ground corridor. 

According to past media reports, there are also aerial and maritime smuggling corridors. Iran has reportedly been highly active in trafficking routes that include flights to Syrian airports, and ships arriving at the Tartus seaport. 

Assad allowed Soleimani's activities in Syria to continue because Damascus is in considerable debt to Tehran for Iran’s assistance during the bloody years of the Syrian civil war. Assad's debt to Iran is being repaid on two levels. On one level, Syria allows Hezbollah to receive weapons smuggled via civilian aviation routes by allowing Iranian planes to arrive at Damascus International Airport. On another level, Assad is allowing the Iranians to construct attack bases in Syria for use against Israel. In fact, it appears likely that Iran has unfettered access and builds such infrastructure without the direct knowledge of Assad. 

Has Iran's intervention in Syria become so vast that it has spun out of Assad's control? This remains an open question. The degree of Iran's intervention in Syria will determine the future stability of Assad, and shape the region’s future challenges, as well as Russia's status in Syria. Does Russia have an interest in further Iranian entrenchment in Syria? The answer is certainly no.

From Israel's perspective, there is no choice but to enforce red lines against Iran. In order to defend itself, its civilians, and their routine daily lives, Israel must ensure that Iran does not establish concrete military threats that can shatter Israel's objectives within a few moments due to their close range. 

Israel must continue to act where it sees the need, and to do so in a manner that prevents war, and which does not collide with the interests of Russia, in order to ensure continued friendly bilateral ties.  

Edited By Natalie Stone