BY Daniel Calbi and Abdulsalam Kako
During a live Zoom debate presented by the MirYam Institute in March, Professor Alan Dershowitz, Professor Michel Paradis, Colonel Eli Baron and Colonel Richard Kemp, the authors had the opportunity to assess the struggle that democracies face in the war against terrorism. Although each of the speakers listed above expressed differences in their beliefs about whether or not democracies can win the war against terrorism, there were many areas of mutual agreement that we believe help to clarify a path forward in this effort.
Overall, the participants were adamant that the majority of the electorate within a democracy must not only support the effort against terrorism over the long run, but that it must also perceive terrorism as an existential threat. However, it was clear to the authors that one of the greatest impediments democracies face against terrorism, is a lack of shared understanding of the problem between government and allies, as well as a failure to establish a clear and defined path to victory.
Terrorism is often defined by an overly broad description that includes individual actors devout to a cause, non-state actors, and state actors. The authors view terrorism as any action(s) by any group or person(s) with the intent to cause fear and harm for a cause. Under this definition, the Iraq was not a war against terrorism. Unfortunately, the repercussions of poor decisions and unclear objectives converted this conventional war into a war against terrorism. Echoing Colonel Eli Baron, we believe that recent wars involved convoluted objectives which led to lost support from the public. In America for instance, when the post 9/11 “we will never forget” emotions wore off, appetite for war in Iraq and Afghanistan diminished. Defeating terror groups is a long term sustained effort. Without a populace that is willing to endure that effort, there can be no successful outcome.
The haphazard manner in which the United States has fought terrorism over the last two decades has been one of everchanging goals, opaque strategy, and wavering commitment. It is important that democracies do not consider the introduction or permeating of democracy to a fragmented nation-state, as victory. But rather the eradication of terror organizations from the safe haven in which they operate. This error in policy is best illustrated by the Iraq war. A conflict undertaken by conflicted reasoning that played out in a manner in which the American-led coalition [IE2] deposed a tyrannical ruler, created a weak government based on Western ideals, then vacillated in the civil and military support as we exited the region. This exit directly enabled an uprising by a destabilized citizenry, cultivating extremism and the eventual birth of ISIS. This faltering resulted in the United States reentering the region to quell terror that it unintentionally enabled. A clear, defined goal agreed upon by the U.S. government, constituents, and allied nations would have done far more in the destruction of terror in the region.
In Afghanistan the U.S. coalition initially treated the Taliban as a terror organization. However, recently the U.S. has started to recognize the Taliban as a credible entity worth negotiating with, in order to establish a formal government treaty and end the ongoing Afghan conflict. This is not without precedent as there have been previous calls over the past two decades advocating for this kind of compromise. Between 2011 and 2014, one element of the Village Stability Operations and Tribal Engagement strategy, was to promote and facilitate the reintegration of Taliban personnel into the recognized local government forces. Given that the idea of negotiating with the Taliban is a reality of the conflict, the concern becomes if this strategy is being facilitated through fear of the public’s lack of support, rather than it being perceived as a wholly viable solution. Wavering public support was identified by Colonel Richard Kemp as a problem constantly faced by democracies. The moral and political conviction is insufficient to win wars today.
During the debate professor Alan Dershowitz stated that war is only one of the necessary components that must be used to defeat regional and international terrorism. Domestic terrorism must be fought primarily by law enforcement; while regional terrorism must be fought by both law enforcement and the military; and international terrorism fought primarily by the military. In contrast, Professor Michel Paradis was adamant that our counter-terrorism efforts must be through the lens of law enforcement. However, Professor Michel Paradis also agreed that even though these efforts must be led by law enforcement, the cooperation and coordination of the military is key to the success of these operations. One need only look at some of the examples over the past two decades where elite members of law enforcement have embedded with special operations teams and deployed overseas to conduct operations against high value targets such as with the capture of al-Qaeda terrorist Nazih Abdul Hamed al-Ruqai from Libya in 2013. Similarly, law enforcement personnel have deployed to Afghanistan to help combat the illegal narcotic trade, and military personnel that have been trained by law enforcement, have deployed to help conduct counter trafficking operations throughout other regions. We believe that these joint law enforcement-military interoperability exercises need to be both increased in quantity and expanded in scope, to successfully end the war on terror.
Prior to the debate we believed that democracies had the capability to defeat terrorism but may lack the conviction and shared commitment to do so. Following the debate our opinion has not changed, yet we are now more concerned of the fact that terrorists are viewing this in terms of fighting a 100-year war. Where democracies answer to the people, the public will not have the patience to fund and fight a 100-year war. The key issue for policymakers will be to successfully appeal to the public about why this war is necessary in order for democracy to continue to thrive within and expand outside of their borders. Policymakers must champion this ideal by showcasing historical examples of success, such as those of joint law enforcement-military operations against terrorism and related criminal activities and proposing to improve upon those efforts.
Daniel Calbi is currently an MBA Candidate at Columbia Business School majoring in Finance. Prior to school he served six and a half years as a U.S. Army Officer, primarily in Special Operations with the 75th Ranger Regiment. He deployed multiple times to combat where he led special operations teams combating ISIS, Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Read full bio here.
Abdulsalam Kako is a U.S. military officer and current student at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He holds a Bachelor of Science in Engineering from the United States Naval Academy and is working on an additional Master’s degree from the Naval War College in Newport, RI. Read full bio here.