ISRAEL'S VIEW OF THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES: A COMPLEX PICTURE

By Yaakov Lappin & Chuck Freilich

As tensions mount on the Israeli-Lebanese border, the role of Lebanon's official military must not be overlooked. Defining an Israeli perspective of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) is more complex than meets the eye. On the one hand, as can be seen from current events, Hezbollah's growing domination of Lebanon's official military is a source of deep concern. On the other, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) maintains regular open channels of communication and coordination with the LAF, which are used to help stabilize the Lebanese – Israeli border area during sensitive times. 

Officers from the IDF's International Cooperation Unit (ICU) meet with counterparts from the LAF every few weeks, at the headquarters of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which hosts the encounters in the Lebanese town of Naqoura. 

The meetings have been successful in their goal of avoiding unintended incidents and border friction, as Operation Northern Shield (December 2018 to January 2019), which was launched to destroy a series of cross-border Hezbollah attack tunnels, has demonstrated. 

At such meetings, the military delegations display English-language presentations to one another, outlining their requirements and outstanding issues. According to former ICU head Brig. Gen. Erez Maisel, "On some days, they [the LAF] would describe us as the Enemy Defense Force. Now they just write 'Israeli Force.'" 

The LAF has raised 13 "areas of contention" with the IDF that touch on the exact location of the Blue Line. At least one of those areas was resolved through military-to-military dialogue, when the IDF offered a solution accepted by the LAF.  

At the same time, IDF commanders have expressed concern over the increasingly cooperative relationship between the LAF and Hezbollah. The LAF does not prevent Hezbollah from entering into any area it pleases and it has a protocol through which its units do not enter southern Lebanese villages without gaining prior Hezbollah approval, which makes sure to remove any incriminating evidence.  

In some cases, Hezbollah personnel wear LAF uniforms and the two even enter villages for joint patrols, which of course allows Hezbollah to prevent any attempts to truly uncover its illegal presence and reimpose Lebanese sovereignty. The cross-border Hezbollah tunnels, which Israel discovered and destroyed last year, were dug under the nose of the LAF. Hezbollah has shown off captured US military equipment, which could only have come from US aid to the LAF.

All of this has helped Hezbollah to circumvent UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which bans it from deploying armed units and weapons into southern Lebanon. The resolution sought to ensure that the LAF would be the sole military force in the region, but Hezbollah has succeeded in subverting it to give it cover for its armed presence. In fact, most villages in southern Lebanon have become bases for Hezbollah rockets and other armed positions, in many cases almost every home. 

What remains unclear is how different components within the LAF view their military's relationship with Hezbollah. 

The possibility of internal divisions appears tangible. The LAF is formally dedicated to the Lebanese state, while Hezbollah is an Iranian-sponsored Shi'ite fighting force that views the Lebanese state, ultimately, as a host to be exploited. This long-standing clash of interests within Lebanon came to the fore once again during the Coronavirus crisis, which further magnified the country's catastrophic economic troubles.

Hezbollah’s presence has not been conducive to efforts by Lebanon to secure an IMF loan, with the organization's chief, Hassan Nasrallah setting conditions for receiving the loans, and warning that a failure to adhere to them could "make the country explode." Nasrallah's fear is that the IMF's conditions for granting the loan could obstruct Hezbollah's ability to exploit Lebanon's banking system. 

For years the US has poured billions into the LAF, over $2 billion since 2005 alone, viewing it as the only force in Lebanon that might prove capable of countering Iranian influence. In addition, the U.S. says that the financial assistance has enabled the LAF to successfully repress ISIS on Lebanon's border with Syria. 

In practice, Hezbollah has long held de facto control over the LAF, which does not make decisions of consequence without its approval. Indeed, in recent years, Hezbollah has come to dominate the government of Lebanon - in reality it is the government - and is also the primary socio economic force in the country. 

The Trump administration, despite its policy of “maximum pressure” towards Iran, recently released $105 million in aid to Lebanon. In Congress, in contrast, pressure is growing to condition at least 20% of the aid to the LAF on a reduction in Hezbollah’s influence over it.  

The LAF could, in theory, fill in a vacuum left in southern Lebanon in the aftermath of a new Israel – Hezbollah war, thereby enabling the IDF to quickly withdraw after a future conflict. This has already been done in the past, and was the intent behind Resolution 1701. Hezbollah’s stranglehold over the LAF and Lebanon, as a whole, however, have proven too strong, but there are few better alternatives.  

For decades, Iran’s Hezbollah proxy has hollowed out the Lebanese state, including the LAF, creating a situation in which it becomes hard to apply leverage, because no one appears to really be in charge and all options are bad. Aid to the LAF has almost become a form of indirect assistance to Hezbollah itself, but to cut it off completely would only strengthen Hezbollah further.

In these circumstances, the Congressional legislation conditioning part of the aid to the LAF on a reduction in Hezbollah’s influence, appears to be a first step in the right direction. Lebanon does need a jolt. Growing pressure must also be brought on France and others to join the US and, more recently, Britain and Germany, in formally designating Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. Growing pressure must also be applied on Hezbollah’s financial channels. 

Israel, for its part, should continue its efforts to document and expose Hezbollah’s takeover of Lebanon and especially the deployment of its forces in the south, in violation of Resolution 1701, as well as the ongoing precision guided missile program. 

For all of the criticism of Israel’s hasbara (public diplomacy), its previous efforts in this area bore fruit and can do so again.

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Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S.

Professor Chuck Freilich, serves as Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science, Dept of Political Science at Columbia University. He is a former deputy national security adviser in Israel and long-time senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, has taught political science at Harvard, Columbia, NYU and Tel Aviv University.

IRAN'S AYATOLLAHS: DOWN, BUT FAR FROM OUT

By Yaakov Peri

Iran has now named Ershad Karimi as the perpetrator of the blast at the Natanz nuclear facility, but the ongoing series of blasts, fires and power failures taking place throughout Iran, including in Tehran, in other locations of strategic significance at the advanced centrifuge development site in Natanz, and the nature of the operations have the hallmarks of a state entity, with highly advanced attack capabilities. The responsible entity certainy has leading capabilities in the realm of cyber, and possibly, in the context of the reported explosions, is the beneficiary of personnel placement inside Iran. 

While it is possible to generate explosions through cyber capabilities, when blasts are involved, operational teams on the ground are a more likely source of attack. 

While the Iran's regime continues to investigate who is responsible, its relative silence is indicative of it's helplessness. Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah, who was expected by some to threaten Israel as a result of the blasts, made no mention of them during a recent speech. He made no mention of them and focused his message upon issues such as the 'agricultural jihad' in Lebanon, a country which is suffering from a severe economic and political crisis. Iran's and its proxies are cultivating a sphere of deniability.

Silence cannot hide the fact that the Iranian regime has failed to protect its most strategically important assets. Naturally, its suspicion will be trained on Israel, and though this could be the latest phase in Israel's shadow war with Iran, other possible operatives cannot be ruled out; including the United States and Arab adversaries of the Islamic Republic such as Saudi Arabia and, very importantly, elements of Iranian opposition must also be considered. 

The continuing nature of the incidents, and the fact that they include power blackouts is significant. More extensive than a temporary power outage, the  blackouts are disruptive to city infrastructure, and are potentially harmful to the Iranian nuclear program. 

The entity responsible for these incidents has also timed them to ensure the maximum effect upon, and bring maximum strain to, an Iranian regime already battling a confluence of challenges. Biting U.S. sanctions and falling oil prices have worsened Iran's economic crisis. The coronavirus pandemic has taken a heavy toll on Iran, though the extent of that toll is being concealed by its government, and a crisis of confidence in their leadership is emerging among the Iranian people. 

These mysterious attacks appear to have damaged Iran's ability to produce advanced uranium enrichment centrifuges and have likely caused significant setbacks to the country's nuclear capabilities. 

The repeated, continuing attacks on Iran's electrical infrastructure also indicates that whoever is behind the incidents now possesses the ability to launch attacks of this type as and when they wish to. 

The image of Iranian regime, having been caught off guard, has weakened at home and the attacks have buoyed the morale of the Iranian opposition that no longer feels alone and isolated. 

And yet, despite all of these setbacks Iran isn't going anywhere as a Shi'ite revolutionary regime.

It will seek to expose the attackers, and it will choose how it responds from a menu of revenge options, including kinetic strikes to cyber attacks, such as those that struck the Israeli water treatment plant. 

Whichever option Iran selects, its response will be calculated to fall short of the threshold of war. Iran has no interest in launching a war against Israel or the U.S. and while its nuclear program has been damaged, the regime will seek to repair that damage, learn relevant lessons and continue its long term conflict with Israel. Despite their efforts to downplay the attacks, Iran will be compelled to respond, if only to salvage the image of the regime. 

As we await Iran's next move, the regime of the Ayatollah's is looking considerably more vulnerable than it would like the Iranian people to know. 

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Mr. Yaakov Peri concluded his distinguished career as Director of the Shin Bet (Israel Security Service). He served in that position from 1988-1995. Prior to that role he held the position of Head of the Shin Bet Northern Command and the Judea & Samaria Command. In 2013 he joined the Yesh Atid party, was elected to the Knesset and was appointed Minister of Science, Technology and Space.

THE SECOND LEBANON WAR: A RETROSPECTIVE

By Noam Tibon

Fourteen years have passed since the eruption of the Second Lebanon War in 2006. Now is an appropriate time to assess the conflict.

 While the Middle East has dramatically changed in the intervening years, the risk of a future Israel – Hezbollah war remains.

 Looking back, it is clear Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah did not anticipate a war would result from the kidnapping raid on IDF reservists patrolling the northern border he ordered. He merely hoped to increase pressure on Israel, which was in the midst of a separate military operation inside the Gaza Strip.

 The kidnapped IDF reservists, Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev, were on their last day of duty. They were ambushed in a vulnerable spot in the sector they patrolled and Hezbollah's attack was well prepared. A deadly, unforeseen chain reaction followed, leading to the Second Lebanon War. 

At its start, neither side had planned for it. By its end, both were claiming victory.

An Iranian proxy, Hezbollah was intended to serve as a deterrent against an Israeli strike on the Iranian nuclear program. It was not intended to initiate regional conflicts. As far as the Iranians were concerned, the war was a disruption to its original plans. But Iran could console itself by its tightened  control over the terror group; a result of the conflict.

The war consisted of two phases. The first prioritized IDF air and artillery power in lieu of a ground offensive. The second phase saw the deployment of ground forces into Lebanon in order to battle Hezbollah.

The first stage witnessed highly effective IDF operations. 

The Israeli Air Force launched a massive bombing campaign against an extensive list of targets, stunning Hezbollah. Israel suffered few civilian casualties as a result of a well organized home front. After one week, Hezbollah was seeking a ceasefire.

That success generated vigorous debate within the IDF General Staff and the Israeli government. The first side of the debate viewed Hezbollah's northern border raid as a local incident. The two kidnapped reservists had not survived the raid. Their view was that Israel should limit the conflagration to the air power and artillery firepower already expended, reaching an end state that was to their advantage if they did so. That view did not prevail. 

Israel's decision to push forward resulted in two developments, both of which impeded the IDF's momentum. 

First, the air force ran out of targets, even as Hezbollah continued to fire its rockets, paralyzing the Israeli home front. 

Secondly, when the ground offensive took shape, a series of operational mistakes occurred, and Israel began absorbing casualties. As those numbers mounted, the Israeli government became less and less inclined to stop the conflict while in a weakened position.

Israel's war planning thus became unbalanced. It was initially predicated upon achieving victory by way of air power, but the ground offensive continued. 

Additionally, prior to the war, the IDF had spent more than five years of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations in the West Bank. Israeli ground forces had not been prepared for a ground maneuver of the nature required in the Lebanese arena, therefore. A ground maneuver was ordered nonetheless.  

But Israeli infantry and armored units struggled to deal with Hezbollah's Kornet anti-tank guided missiles, fired in open areas and built up combat zones alike. 

In the battle of Wadi Saluki, Hezbollah cells, armed with anti-tank missiles, faced off against Merkava tanks from the IDF's 162 Division, resulting in a relatively high number of IDF casualties.

Paratrooper reservists also absorbed many casualties in firefights with Hezbollah. Those events soured Israeli public opinion against the war.

Though the IDF succeeded territorially, the tone felt by many Israelis was one of failure. As that sense increased, Israel requested a ceasefire.

A key lesson from the conflict is that when flooded with enemy rockets, the ability of Israel's home front to continue to function is extremely finite.  

In the months and years that followed, struggles were waged over how to assess the war. 

Some Israeli political figures sought to present it as a failure, a characterization further fueled by Hezbollah's own description of their ability to merely survive an Israeli military campaign as a "divine victory."

 But today, with the passage of time, we know that Hezbollah was far more damaged than was believed in 2006. 

We also know that Israel achieved a significant level of deterrence, which remains in place to this day. Hezbollah's chief remains confined to a bunker. 

Yet the aftermath of that war is still central to the IDF's planning in 2020. 

Last year's public dispute between former IDF ombudsman, Maj. Gen. (res.) Yitzhak Brick, and then IDF Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Gadi Eisenkot, over the readiness of the ground forces, is an example of that.

The IDF has purchased advanced new armored personnel carriers and tanks, and installed active defenses on its armored vehicles. But most of the army still relies on old equipment and would have to conduct a maneuver without such protection.  

Since - and as a result of - the war, Hezbollah has tripled its projectile arsenal. It has placed strong emphasis on building up its stockpile of precision guided missiles. Israel is combating that build up, primarily on Syrian soil and in Syrian skies. 

While neither Hezbollah nor Israel are interested in entering into a conflict in the near term, the central lesson of the Second Lebanon War is that such a war can occur even if no one desires it. 

The IDF's mission is to ensure readiness, maintain full alert on Israel's northern border and prevent war if possible. But if it erupts, Israel is prepared to do what is needed in order to achieve a rapid and decisive victory, including raining down destruction throughout Lebanon. 

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Major General Tibon spent his military career specializing in counter terrorism and homeland security. His command positions include service as Commander of the 202nd Battalion of the Paratroopers Brigade, Deputy Commander of the Paratroopers Brigade, Commander of the Etzion Regional Brigade, Commander of the Judea Regional Brigade, Commander of the “Nahal” Brigade, Head of the Personnel Division of the IDF Ground Forces, Chief of the Infantry and Paratroopers Corps, Commander of the Judea and Samaria Division and Commander of the Command and Staff College, IDF. His most recent military position was Commander of the Northern Formation.

Where are the consequences for DeSean Jackson’s rant against Jews?

By Mark Goldfeder

We are living in a moment of righteous awakening that has resulted in a long-overdue movement to end systemic racism and call out those who are not on board. We fire people over old tweets that do not live up to 2020 standards, even if the writers apologize or try to contextualize them. There is zero tolerance for hate, or even for insufficient sensitivity. Unless, apparently, the group being discriminated against is Jews.

It’s hard to draw a different conclusion from the saga of Philadelphia Eagles wide receiver DeSean Jackson. In a series of Instagram posts, Jackson praised the noted anti-Semite Louis Farrakhan, leader of the Nation of Islam, designated by the Southern Poverty Law Center as a hate group for its hostility to Jews. He also posted a text attributed — mistakenly — to Adolf Hitler claiming that “white Jews” are exploiting black Americans and resorting to blackmail and extortion to advance “their plan for world domination.”

Jackson’s post was not vague and did not speak in generalities. The text he shared with his 1.4 million followers touted age-old conspiracy theories about Jewish manipulation and encouraged others to study Nazi ideology to confirm that Hitler was right about the Jews.

For everyone who has ever expressed outrage about a public figure suspected of covertly dog-whistling to neo-Nazis: A star athlete with a massive following overtly praised, and tried to spread the teachings of, the genocidal leader of the real Nazi Party. He asked others to learn from a monster who also persecuted and murdered black people, gay people and other minorities. Where is the outrage now?

The subdued reaction to Jackson’s comments has been alarming. Yes, the Eagles organization fined Jackson an undisclosed amount and issued a statement saying the posts were “absolutely appalling.” But it made only a vague promise to continue “to evaluate the circumstances” and “take appropriate action.” The NFL said the comments were “highly inappropriate,” yet punted the matter back to the team. Jackson himself attempted an apology, but implausibly claimed that he “really didn’t realize what [the purported Hitler] passage was saying.” In some corners of social media, Jackson has been appropriately excoriated for his actions. But other prominent athletes — former NBA player Stephen Jackson and Eagles defensive lineman Malik Jackson — have defended his comments, saying he was “speaking the truth” in one case and praising Farrakhan as “honorable” in the other.

There has been no massive backlash, no outpouring of denunciations from celebrities, and no real accountability — in the form of a suspension or, ideally, termination. As former Eagles team president Joe Banner suggested, it’s hard to imagine that the response would be as muffled if Jackson’s vile posts had targeted any other minority group.

This is how anti-Semitism works: It starts with horrific lies about Jews that legitimize hate and then grows more entrenched when no one takes a firm stand against it.

Unfortunately, anti-Semitism is a very real problem in our country. Each year since 1979, the Anti-Defamation League has published a report measuring the number of anti-Semitic acts in the U.S. In 2017, there were 1,986 reported incidents, a 57 percent increase over the previous year, and the biggest annual jump since the organization started tracking these numbers. In 2018, there was a 105 percent increase in the number of recorded physical assaults, including the deadliest attack on Jews in U.S. history at the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh. In 2019, the total number of anti-Semitic incidents increased 12 percent over the previous year, with a 56 percent increase in physical assaults. There were, on average, nearly six anti-Semitic incidents in the U.S. each day.

According to the FBI, the majority of religiously motivated hate crimes in the United States are committed against Jewish people, despite the fact that they make up less than 2 percent of the population. On campuses around the country, anti-Semitism has become rampant, with recent studies showing that the number of Jewish students experiencing anti-Semitism on campuses across the United States had spiked to nearly 75 percent.

These trends are terrifying, and there is much work to be done to reverse them. It starts with calling out anti-Semitism for what it is: hate speech that, while legally protected, should never be acceptable in decent society. If DeSean Jackson avoids meaningful censure, it sends the dangerous message that the kind of hatred he espoused is tolerable — and that, in a moment when we are making impressive strides toward greater equality for people of all races and creeds, it’s somehow okay to leave the Jews behind.

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Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations.

AOC should stop pretending to be an Israel expert

By Mark Goldfeder

A dozen radical lawmakers known for their anti-Israel bias, led by New York Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, have sent a letter to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo decrying Israel’s plans to begin implementing President Trump’s Vision for Peace and calling for the United States to withhold military aid if Israel applies its law to some of the territories in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) over which Israel has lawful sovereign rights.

The letter demonstrates once again that Ocasio-Cortez and her fellow leaders of the left wing of the Democratic Party are trying to turn what has long been a staple of bipartisan agreement, support for Israel, into just another area of conflict. Constituents need to understand exactly whom they might be voting for in November: politicians who actively promote false narratives with potentially critical implications.

Ocasio-Cortez's letter is disingenuous and dangerous. Legal terms have precise definitions. For example, the West Bank is not illegally occupied. Israel’s planned extension of civil law to Judea and Samaria and the Jordan Valley is not an annexation.

Occupation occurs only when a country takes control of a territory owned by another legitimate sovereign. Annexation is the forcible acquisition of one state's territory by another state. There is not yet, nor has there ever been, a state of Palestine from which to take. If there were, calls for a two-state solution would be redundant.

Israel is the only country in existence with any legal claim to title and sovereignty over the territory in question. The Jewish people’s rights to the land were guaranteed by the 1920 San Remo Resolution and the 1922 Mandate, then reconfirmed by the 1945 United Nations Charter. Israel lawfully inherited title to and de jure sovereignty of the full mandatory area when Israel emerged from the mandatory system.

After Jordan (along with five Arab countries) invaded Israel in 1948, Jordan seized and illegally occupied Judea, Samaria, and the Jordan Valley for 19 years, renaming this area "the West Bank." Although Israel lost de facto possession of this territory for that period, Israel never lost her sovereign rights, guaranteed under binding international law. Israel regained control over this territory in a defensive war in 1967.

Ocasio-Cortez's letter seems oblivious to the fact that, despite the legality of its territorial control, Israel has already given back the vast majority of the land it retook. It did so in a series of attempts to make peace. Israel gained a total of 26,178 square miles of territory in 1967. To date, it has ceded sovereignty over 23,871 square miles of that or 87% of that territory. At various times in recent history (including deals proposed in 2000, 2008, and 2014), Israel has offered up to 99.3% of the remaining disputed territory in exchange for peace. Each time, the Palestinians refused.

Ocasio-Cortez's letter simply ignores legitimate Israeli rights and security needs, or that there could be any Jewish equivalent of the endorsed Palestinian “national rights.” Likewise, the letter makes no mention of the Palestinian Authority’s intransigence and support for terrorism, including payments to terrorists to murder Jews.

Indeed, there is no mention of Palestinian wrongdoing at all. The words peace, coexistence, and negotiations appear nowhere in the document. It does, however, include the absurd claim that the Palestinians “understandably refused to participate in a process that is not grounded in a recognition of their national rights under international law.” That sentiment sounds reasonable only if you ignore both the Palestinian Authority’s history of turning down generous proposals, and their blanket refusal to engage in the very peace talks that led to this moment — talks that once again included the opportunity for a Palestinian state.

That opportunity is still very much on the table, should Palestinian leaders choose to come and sit.

Ocasio-Cortez’s letter is also dangerous because U.S. military aid to Israel, while generous, is an investment, not charity. Supporting Israel in combating Middle Eastern terrorist groups and expansionist potentates is crucial for America’s own national security. Israel is our closest ally in the Middle East and our only reliable source of intelligence and cyberdefense.

Our shared security interests include but are not limited to preventing nuclear proliferation, combating terrorism, containing Iranian, Turkish, and Russian expansionism, and promoting the rule of democracy. Israeli-developed technology protects our citizens and troops at home and abroad. In addition, U.S. military aid to Israel is actually spent in the U.S., providing jobs and economic growth that benefits our own defense industry. Jeopardizing these benefits while pressuring a longtime ally to surrender both its rights and its attempt to forge a lasting peace, in a hostile region with an unwilling partner, under a plan sanctioned by our president no less, is simply not defensible.

Israel has the legal right to implement the Vision for Peace and to exercise Israeli law over land that Israel owns. American politicians have the moral responsibility to not hurl false accusations at our allies and to protect our own security interests by protecting the U.S.-Israel alliance.

Already two years ago, when Ocasio-Cortez was first campaigning, she criticized Israel and referred to Israel’s presence in the West Bank as an occupation. When pushed by PBS’s Margaret Hoover to explain why she said that, she was unable to answer, and tried to laugh it off by explaining that she is not an expert on the issue. Now that she is in Congress, she needs to stop pretending to be one.

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Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations.

VIDEO: TARGETED KILLINGS: STRATEGIC ASSET?

 A Conversation With Israeli Intel. Officer, David Hacham

WHO BY CELLPHONE? WHO BY MISSILE? WHO BY BOMBING? ISRAEL'S TARGETED KILLINGS WILL CONTINUE

By David Hacham

After a five year moratorium, Israel's targeted killings reemerged in November of last year when the IDF conducted a missile strike against the Northern Brigade commander of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Bahaa Abu Al-Ata, in Gaza. 

The IDF emphasized that Al-Ata had become a ticking time bomb who refused to respond to prior warnings. The strike led to a 48-hour round of intense escalation.

The use of targeted killings has stirred animated controversies, and has led many, particularly overseas human rights organizations, to criticize Israel's policy. Such organizations perceive it as an illegitimate and immoral policy, describing it as "an execution without trial." 

Yet, in the conditions of today, targeted killings remain a vital part of Israel's ongoing strategy, one which will likely be used again in the future in order to maintain our clear-cut advantage in the war against terrorism. 

Israel's advanced operational and intelligence capabilities, and determination to implement surgical killings, constitute a source of constant threat to those seeking to harm it's security. 

One need only look at the list of those targeted for killing in order to understand the anxiety the practice causes among Israel's enemies.   

Hamas founder and leader, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, was killed in an Israeli airstrike in Gaza on March 22, 2004, while his successor, Dr. Abdel Aziz Al-Rantisi, was killed weeks later, on April 17, 2004. On April 16, 1988, an elite IDF unit assassinated one of Fatah's key founders in Tunis, Khalil Al-Wazir, also known as Abu Jihad. 

Sheikh Yassin played a central role in the founding of Hamas. I knew him - personally - and held many meetings with him, both in my office and in his Gazan home, when I served as head of the Arab Affairs Department in the IDF's Military Administration of Gaza during the years of the First Intifada, from 1987 to 1993. 

Despite his total physical disability, Yassin was able to ingeniously seize upon a grave strategic error committed by Israel in 1987, when it approved the founding of the Al-Mujama Al-Islami religious charity association. Throughout the 1980s, Yassin consolidated his position in Gaza through the use of 'Da'wa' - establishing a wide Islamist religious civilian infrastructure, and using it to take over institutions and associations for the purpose of boosting his status as a rival to the nationalist Fatah movement.  

Yassin was laying down the building blocks for what would evolve into Hamas. Hamas officially came into being during the early days of the First Intifada, which erupted on December 9, 1987. 

Rantisi, a pediatrician by profession, replaced Sheikh Yassin as Hamas leader. Like Yassin, I knew Rantisi well from my military service in Gaza. It was impossible to miss his burning hatred of Israel and Jews. Each time we'd meet, I'd feel his hateful gaze upon me. Rantisi was also a founding member of Hamas, and he was one of the 415 Hamas and Palestinian (PIJ) terrorists deported to Lebanon in December 1992 by the Rabin government in response to the kidnapping and murder of Israeli Border Policeman Nissim Toledano. Rantisi spent a year in a southern Lebanese camp, during which time he stood out as a leader and a speaker, and rose to a senior, unshakeable position within the organization. 

Another senior terror figure who was eliminated from the scene through a targeted operation was Fathi Al-Shkaki, a founder and first operational head of PIJ. He was killed in Malta on October 26, 1995, in a Mossad special operation. I knew Shkaki very well. He studied medicine in Egypt, where he was first exposed to the Muslim Brotherhood ideology. Upon his return to Gaza, he became active in PIJ. He was arrested by Israel in 1986, and expelled to Lebanon in 1988 during the First Intifada. After his expulsion, Shkaki was able to reorganize PIJ into a deadly terror group, and assume the role of its exclusive leader. 

An additional prominent figure targeted by Israel for assassination was Yahya Ayash, also known as 'the engineer,' a senior Hamas operative who masterminded many deadly suicide bombings against Israelis in the 1990s. Yahya's killing occurred on January 5, 1996, through a boobytrapped cell phone, in which 50 grams of explosives had been planted. Ayash was in a hideout apartment in Bet Lahiya in northern Gaza when he received the phone from a Shin Bet Palestinian agent. The killing was the product of a complex and sophisticated operation, which included meticulous planning, and outside-of-the-box thinking.

In December 2006, the High Court of Israel ruled that striking those taking a direct part in hostile, violent activities is a legitimate tool, but can only be used in order to prevent future attacks, rather than as retribution, revenge, punishment, or deterrence.  

The ruling also said that the harm to noncombatants has to meet standards of proportionality to the military value of the target. Many bitter arguments in Israel arose over targeted killings, most prominently, after the July 2002 air strike that killed Hamas operative Salah Shhada, alongside 14 civilians in a Gazan residential building. 

The Israeli government set up a committee to check the IDF's conduct in that incident, and found that no criminal offenses were committed. But it did find that an intelligence failure had occurred causing disproportionate harm to civilians. 

Looking back, there can be no dispute that targeted killings form one of the most critical and important methods Israel has in its long-term war against terrorism. The end objective is to minimize the scope of terror attacks by removing those who plot and initiate operations from the scene. Such strikes cause significant harm to operational terror capabilities, morale, and future motivation to implement terror attacks. 

Targeted killings stir fear among those terrorists seeking to do harm. Their use pushes terror organizations into defensive positions. They have a paralyzing effect, at least temporarily. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the influence of this tool is ultimately limited and short-term. 

After the initial shock, new operatives rise up and fill the ranks, but the very real threat of their removal, as was the case with Rantisi, successor to Sheikh Yassin, looms large; as it is intended to do.

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David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense.

DEBATE VIDEO: SHOULD ISRAEL APPLY SOVEREIGNTY NOW?

The Latest In The MirYam Institute Debate Series 

Israel Should Extend Sovereignty to the Jordan Valley Now

By Jeremiah Rozman

There is strong consensus among Israel’s defense establishment that Israel must maintain a permanent military presence in the Jordan Valley. Extending sovereignty is the best way to secure that. Sovereignty also facilitates peace talks by removing a non-starter from the discourse. Sovereignty’s benefits outweigh the risks, while continuing the status quo harms growth, does not prevent international scorn and entails long-term risks. Israel should seize the opportunity provided by its historically large government, the Trump administration’s “Peace to Prosperity” vision, and favorable international conditions to extend sovereignty to the Jordan Valley.

The Jordan Valley’s strategic importance 

Prime Ministers spanning Israel’s political spectrum, including: Rabin, Barak, Sharon and Netanyahu, all staunchly supported retaining permanent control of the Jordan Valley. Military control allows Israel to enforce the demilitarization of a future Palestinian entity, defend against conventional attack, deter and prevent forces from destabilizing Jordan, and mobilize reservists along interior lines.

Past withdrawals have failed to achieve peace, weakening Israel’s security in the process. Understanding these lessons, no responsible leader should cede control over strategic territory in an unstable region, to an untrustworthy entity. Israel’s evolving defensive capabilities do not minimize the importance of territorial control. Active defense entails taking fire which hurts Israel’s economy and traumatizes its citizens. The less Israel has to rely on it, the better. 

Israeli control of the Jordan Valley is key to preventing the “Gazafication” of any future Palestinian sovereign entity. Without it, militants can infiltrate from anywhere in the Middle East, extending Iran’s reach, and that of other militants, to territory bordering the Jerusalem-Ashdod-Haifa triangle, home to 70 percent of Israel’s population and 80 percent of its economic infrastructure. Foreign forces and “trip-wires” cannot prevent this. For example, the United Nations failed to enforce Hezbollah disarmament following the 2006 Lebanon War. 

Sovereignty, not status-quo

60% of Israelis with a clear opinion want the government to extend sovereignty to the Jordan Valley. Some experts argue that sovereignty would unnecessarily focus negative attention upon Israel, and they advocate for Israel to simply continue building “facts on the ground.” Such an approach has not shielded Israel from international condemnation in the past. 

Continuing the status quo neither moves the peace process forward, nor enhances Israel’s future prospects. It asks Israel to 'play dumb' and assumes that the international community and the Palestinians will play along indefinitely. This risks Israel being pressured into a withdrawal from the Jordan Valley in the next peace process as it was under the 2013 John Kerry led initiative. 

Israel has historically failed to maintain a military presence beyond its borders. Extending sovereignty now, under the auspices of a U.S. proposal, would create a powerful political “fact on the ground,” while continued limbo disincentivizes investment in civil infrastructure needed to build a de-facto presence.

The Risks

The Jordan Valley contains only 58,000 Palestinian Arabs who will likely remain under PA sovereignty. The demographic risk is a non-issue. Sovereignty enjoys significant public support and diplomatic risks are overblown. 

The Palestinian Authority

Israel’s mutually beneficial cooperation with the PA is unlikely to suffer significantly. Abbas’s oft-repeated threat to cut security ties is hollow. The PA relies on the IDF to keep Hamas from throwing its men off of roofs as they did in Gaza. This is why despite numerous threats, in practice, the PA will likely continue security cooperation.

Jordan

Israel and the U.S. both desire good relations with Jordan. However, Jordan faces severe challenges to its stability, relies heavily on U.S. support, and benefits from the IDF securing its western border. It is therefore unlikely to curtail cooperation over territory that it ceded its claim to in 1988. Senior Jordanian officials have reportedly signaled this position repeatedly to Israel and to other leaders involved in the U.S. led peace initiative.

Regional powers

Increased threat from Iran and decreased importance of Middle Eastern oil lead regional powers to seek stronger ties with the U.S. and Israel. Several Arab countries are quietly backing the U.S. plan allowing Israel to extend sovereignty. Senior Saudi officials reportedly said that for many Arab states, official opposition is for show. 

The E.U. and international bodies

The EU has voiced strong opposition to Israel’s sovereignty plans. Hungary and Austria have prevented unanimous condemnation and will likely make it impossible for it to impose sanctions on Israel, while mutually beneficial trade and defense ties are unlikely to suffer much. 

The International Criminal Court (ICC) also expressed concern. In the past it has sought to prosecute Israelis for fighting Hamas. If Israel is criticized for defending itself against a terrorist entity which calls for genocide in its charter, there is little reason to believe that it can ever avoid being the target of a double standard by the ICC or other international bodies. The U.S. recently rejected the ICC’s power to charge its troops. Its authority should not be overestimated. 

The U.S.

The Trump administration’s approach to Israel has gained rising legitimacy as its political opponents’ predictions of “a regional explosion” over moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem or recognizing Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights failed to materialize. U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo’s most recent statements called extending sovereignty “a decision for the Israeli government.” He noted regional support and expressed disappointment over the PA’s refusal to participate in negotiations. Future administrations from either party are unlikely to pressure Israel to withdraw once sovereignty is an established fact. Nor would they be likely to curtail defense, intelligence, trade or diplomatic relations which enjoy strong congressional and popular support. 

Conclusion

There is broad consensus that Israel must maintain military control in the Jordan Valley. Continuing the status quo does Israel no favors, while the risks of extending sovereignty are likely overblown. Sovereignty reduces the likelihood that Israel will be pressured into further withdrawal. It also removes ambiguity, enhancing Israel’s ability to build infrastructure. This will yield economic as well as security dividends. Israel should seize the current opportunity. Long-term ambiguity is not in Israel’s interest despite it consistently being the easier short-term route. 

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Jeremiah Rozman currently works as the National Security Analyst at a DC-based think tank. From 2006-2009 he served as an infantryman in the IDF. His regional expertise is in the Middle East and Russia. He designed and taught an undergraduate course on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

HOW ISRAEL CAN ANSWER THE CHINA QUESTION

By Efraim Chalamish

Pompeo’s recent visit to Israel during the Covid-19 pandemic and the public controversy surrounding Chinese involvement in Israel’s companies and infrastructure have intensified the discussion about the way Israel balances U.S. and Chinese interests in the region.

There is no doubt that China’s engagement with Israel has been on the rise for a few years now on all levels, including: a 5 times increase of Israeli export to China this past decade, the rising Chinese capital flows into Israel’s tech and innovation ecosystem, and the intense participation of Chinese companies in pubic tenders and key infrastructure projects.

The Israel-China economic renaissance has been driven by a well-designed government-to-government dialogue alongside strategic initiatives among public and private entities in academia, business, and NGOs.  

Yet, very little attention has been paid to the need to balance the multiple interests in the region. The Israel-US unique nexus and the Israel-China track have been perceived as parallel, with limited points of intersection. However, this might have to change as the Trump Administration perceives China as a strategic threat and as China’s involvement in Israel expands to include Israeli strategic assets, such as its ports.

The growing calls from Washington and other parts of the international security community to reduce Israel’s dependence on China have been characterized as a zero-sum game. 

That said, recent experience shows that Israel can navigate this potential crisis well and should continue the constructive dialogue with both nations concurrently.

First, Israel is not the first nation to chart these waters and should learn from the experiences of others. The EU and its member states are facing similar dilemmas. When Mathias Dopfner, the CEO of influential media conglomerate Axel Springer, called for an economic and tech ‘de-coupling’ from China post-Covid19, many European politicians and business leaders criticized him for picking a side.

On a related note, various countries had to decide if and how to implement Chinese 5G technology, while the U.S. administration has been trying to prevent such adoption. 

Most countries found a middle ground by allowing Chinese 5G technology in certain parts of the market that are more secured. The British government, for one, announced at the beginning of 2020 that it would cap Huawei’s market share at 35% and exclude the vendor from sensitive locations. 

That decision was criticized by a Chinese PR campaign and is under review by the UK government for security reasons. While Chinese companies are currently excluded from Israel’s 5G technology push, a similar, more balanced approach, may be needed with respect to other aspects of Israel’s tech environment. 

Second, the Israeli government adopted a screening mechanism for foreign investments for national security purposes. Unlike the U.S., Canada and other nations, the Israeli mechanism has been kept secret with limited execution. The ramifications are significant. The lack of transparency creates uncertainty in the market, both in Israel and China, and imposes constraints on capital flows. It also gives the impression that Israel doesn’t do enough to consider security interests and US-Israel bilateral relations.

Israel needs to open the process, engage the private sector more closely, and develop a reporting mechanism which would give the process the credibility and legitimacy necessary for its success. 

Third, significant parts of the current Israel-US tension surrounding the ‘Chinese Question’ result from Trump’s specific take on trade and investment protectionist measures and the Chinese threat to U.S. allies. It is not unreasonable to think that some of these policies may change during a Biden Administration following the upcoming November 2020 elections. Many of the Israeli projects being criticized by the U.S. government are long-term and it would be prudent to re-assess them following the U.S. election season.

Fourth, several sectors in the Israeli market are lacking major U.S. participation, such as construction. The construction and renewables sectors have been dominated by European and Asian players in recent years. The U.S. government should do more to bring American players to Israel’s infrastructure space.

Fifth, as more military technologies globally are being used for civilian purposes and vice versa, there is a growing connection between ‘dual use’ export-control regime and screening of foreign investment for national security risks. The U.S. is going through a similar transition. Israel has a sophisticated export control mechanism but a very limited review process of foreign investors. Israel should bring these 2 regimes closer to each other. The tech industry has rejected the government’s review of tech investments, while embracing a careful approach to the export of sensitive technologies. 

The time for change has come.

Also, any review of Chinese commercial activity should be conducted via intra-disciplinary lenses, including diplomatic, commercial, and civic factors. Israel’s National Security Council (NSC), currently responsible to execute Israel-China strategy on this matter, has been historically lacking the resources and the capabilities to support such a review. 

Incidents like the military action against the Turkish flotilla in 2010 that reshaped Israel-Turkey relations emphasize the risk of over-reliance on security concerns. Empowering and strengthening the Israeli NSC should be part of the new Israel-US-China balancing act.

Finally, international trade has been shifting directions. Asian international trade, mostly from China, is now more than twice as big as America’s international trade. Israel cannot ignore the changing economic reality, and ‘de-coupling’ is less attractive in the Israeli unique economic context. 

Yet, Chinese bidders have lost major tenders in Israel lately, such as the world’s largest desalination plant and Ramat Hovav’s power plant. It reflects both Israel’s policy preferences as well as new commercial and financial constraints in China. But while Israel tends to think about the here and now, China has a very long-term view on global and local markets. 

Israel should show China that it knows how to address real security concerns while keeping the critical flow of inbound capital. 

Balancing US and Chinese interests in the region is not an impossible task and the benefits are compelling.

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Dr. Efraim Chalamish is an international economic law professor, advisor, and media commentator. He has been involved in international legal practice in New York, Paris and Israel, along with research in, and analysis of, cutting edge areas in public and private international economic law. Dr. Chalamish teaches at NYU Law School.

VIDEO: SIX DAYS AND D-DAY - Roundtable With Senior Israeli, US And British Commanders

THE SIX DAY WAR: A PARADIGM FROM A PREVIOUS CENTURY

By Gershon Hacohen

Following the publication of the Trump peace plan, scores of retired senior members of Israel’s defense establishment campaigned in opposition to the application of Israeli sovereignty over areas that are vital to Israel's security in Judea and Samaria and the Jordan Valley. 

They assert that Israel will retain its ability to defend itself even if it withdraws from most of the territories conquered during the Six Day War, believing that the IDF can replicate its 1967 achievements, on demand. 

Such perspectives reflect a blindness and obliviousness to the changes that have taken place over the course of several decades in the area of warfare - both in Israel, and generally. 

They overestimate the IDF's power and grossly underestimate the capabilities of Israel's enemies. 

The storied successes of the Six Day War resulted from unique military phenomena that nobody should reasonably expect to be repeated.

On both the Israeli Right and Left, Israel’s success continues to stir an expectation of a future ‘victory’ to which the IDF is unrealistically held.

Those former generals and commanders who took part in the 1967 conflict who still expect the IDF to achieve a victory similar to the one it did then fail to realize how fundamental the changes are between the 1967 battlefield and the theatre of today. 

The Six Day War was the last military clash that occurred along the patterns of the Second World War.   

The IDF operated against conventional, regular militaries that fought on the basis of British or Soviet doctrines, with full symmetry. That enabled Israel to achieve tactical and operational supremacy at every encounter. 

Mechanized combat in desert surroundings, or in the open settings of the Golan Heights, enabled the IDF to identify a clear advantage over its adversaries - despite the odds it faced. 

The lightning attack against the Jordanian Legion in Judea and Samaria followed similar patterns. Using a moderate number of armored and mechanized brigades, made up of conscripted and reserve forces and backed by outstanding air power, the State of Israel maximized the potency of a powerful military force, suited to the arenas in which it fought, drawn from a society of some two million citizens. 

The IDF's armored formations channeled the swift offensive tactic of the German blitzkrieg of the Second World War. In the open areas of Sinai and the Golan Heights, the IDF overcame its adversaries by using modern, mechanized combat. 

Since that time, Arab militaries have metamorphosized, something first demonstrated during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, under the direction of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. Just a few years after The Six Day War, Arab militaries had adapted to a military process better suited to them. 

Anti-tank missiles were widely distributed among infantry units - and a dense air defense system based on surface-to-air missiles, combined to create a significant obstacle that blocked and impeded a swift IDF offensive; by air, or on land. 

These challenges and adaptations, designed to blunt the momentum of Israeli maneuvers, have only mutated and intensified since then. 

In the modern era, and particularly after the IDF's withdrawal from Lebanon, Hezbollah has played an important role in the overall conceptual upgrade undertaken by Israel's enemies. The creativity used by Hezbollah to design its operations, out of a cognizance of where it is inferior to the IDF, is a strong example of organizational adaptation, both at the tactical and the operational levels.

Hezbollah's unique system of organization was demonstrated in its force build-up and actions; something particularly visible in the realm of widespread, unprecedented rocket fire, and its use of dense defensive systems that are dug into bunkers. 

These rockets and bunkers were placed in villages, both above and below ground, and in mountainous terrain. Such diversity demonstrates their ability to exploit the environment in which it seeks to achieve its objectives, while reducing and even overcoming the IDF's areas of supremacy. 

Such thinking, adapted for the environment at play, has also been applied in the Gaza Strip since 2006. 

In the past three rounds of conflict between the IDF and Hamas, two core components - rocket fire and defensive strongholds - challenged the IDF and drew it into broad, multi-domain conflicts. 

Israel's adversaries have traded open terrain for urban battlefields. A tank brigade is now forced to adapt itself to warfare in built-up areas and to function as a combined force with the infantry and engineering units. But unlike in the open, an infantry battalion consisting of over 400 soldiers can be swallowed whole by a single street as it tries to cleanse it of combatants. That reality has dulled the IDF’s abilities. 

Additionally, as radical Islamic forces grow in numbers, so too does the fierce belief of Islamist fighters, who demonstrate a willingness and readiness to die for their cause; a reality with which we must contend in the modern battlefield.

None of these factors was at play during the Six Day War.

Each of these developments lead directly back to the heart of Israel’s domestic division over the application of sovereignty to the vital areas obtained during the Six Day War. 

Those who support the traditional two-state solution do so based upon a totally false assumption; namely that Israel will be able to defend itself, by itself despite a withdrawal to pre-1967 armistice lines, something they recommend albeit with minor adaptations, and despite the surrender of any strategic depth. 

Supporters of the two state solution evoke the victory of the Six Day War in order to support their position, while ignoring the massive changes that have occurred since then.

Expecting a victory similar to one Israel won in 1967 is akin to expecting a second parting of the Red Sea. 

The Six Day War configuration cannot be replicated, nor can the advantageous conditions enjoyed by the IDF in 1967. 

Those circumstances, and the crushing victories that resulted, belong in the previous century - as does the two state solution, for which too many commanders of the past continue to call!

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Major General Gershon Hacohen served as Commander of the Northern Corps of the IDF. He previously held various positions, including Commander of the IDF Colleges, Head of Training & Doctrine Division in the General Staff, Reserve Division Commander of the Northern Command and Commander of the 7th Brigade of the IDF Armor Division.

THE SIX DAY WAR: ISRAEL'S AIR FORCE SEIZES THE ADVANTAGE

By Avishai Levi

The Six Day War presents an exceptional case study of the Israeli Air Force’s ethos of military planning and preparation - something that resulted from the clear understanding that the country’s very existence rested - in no small part - upon the shoulders of its pilots, air crew and ground crews.

On land, tens of thousands of graves had been dug to be filled by the anticipated casualties of war. Our young nation felt like it was on the edge of the abyss, with powerful enemies rounding upon it in the form of several Arab militaries.

The sense throughout the defense establishment was that if Israel was to avoid what it perceived to be a looming second Holocaust, it must capitalize upon the first opportunity to push back the threats massing against it to the north and, much more forebodingly, to the south. Primary among those threats was the mighty Egyptian Air Force. 

A failure to preempt those dangers would have left us imperiled. 

It would rely upon intelligence gathering, doctrinal contrarianism, logistical daring, the exploitation of the mundane and communications discipline.

INTELLIGENCE

Israel acquired and deciphered detailed intelligence as it studied its enemies. As they built up their military forces and declared their intention to eliminate the Jewish state, Israel observed.  

In 1967, Arab militaries based much of their strategy and battle doctrine on Soviet concepts; a doctrine Israel closely studied. Combined with the ongoing intelligence effort, Israel came to receive rivers of information on the military capabilities of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan - both in the air and on land. 

As a result, we deduced the tactical and strategic calculations of enemy commanders, turning that information to our advantage. 

This was particularly true in the case of Nasser's Egypt; the leader of the Arab world. 

Compared to the air forces of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, the IAF had to concede that it suffered from a massive shortage of planes. 

Because our forces were so scant, a strict prioritization of targets was required and priority number one was hitting the Egyptian Air Force - before it left the runway - in a daring mission known as Operation Moked. 

DOCTRINAL CONTRARIANISM 

Calibrated to a precision of seconds and meters, the strike required the dispatch of the maximum number of planes possible for a wave of attacks against the Egyptian Air Force; the first wave of which had to massively impede the Egyptian takeoff capabilities. 

If that first wave failed, Israel would have been exposed to painful aerial attacks at home. Israel’s need to incapacitate enemy aircraft meant very few planes were reserved for defense; far fewer than is endorsed by any known military defense doctrine. Israel went all in.

Every individual, from the mechanic to the pilot, knew their role - precisely. In most combat sorties, pilots typically learn of their destination just prior to take off. Every pilot in Operation Moked knew their precise location in the attack formation, and where they would be flying to, well in advance. 

LOGISTICAL DARING

The distance between Israel’s airfields and the more distant Egyptian Air Force bases made fuel efficiency a priority. Israel’s pilots had to practically drain their supplies in order to target Egypt’s Soviet supplied strategic bombers, which had the ability to reach Tel Aviv.  

Attack planes would need rapid turn around as well.

They had to land, rearm, refuel, and be airborne for the next wave, without delay, to avoid retaliatory air raids. 

The ground crew’s ability to rearm and repair aircraft had to be as rapid and efficient as possible. 

Because Israel needed the maximum number of planes possible for the purposes of the  bombings, while planning the mission, it logged the precise details of when enemy air forces conducted routine defense air patrols, and when those patrols changed over. It did so not with a view to downing those patrols, but to avoiding them and preventing dog fights, freeing up Israeli aircraft to concentrate on bombing stationery targets on the ground. After many months of surveillance, the IAF had a clear idea of the optimal time to strike.

EXPLOITING THE MUNDANE: RUSH-HOUR IN CAIRO

Even rush hour traffic in Cairo was exploited to Israel’s advantage. The first strike took place at the point when the Egyptian Chief of Staff and Air Force command officers left their homes bound for their offices. Israel thus maximized the length of time they would be in transition, without direct contact with their forces. 

Egyptian decision-making was effectively paralyzed, allowing additional time for the bombing waves to take place.

COMMUNICATIONS DISCIPLINE

On the morning of the attack, the IAF's flight school conducted training flights, creating a veil of normality for the watching Egyptians. 

To lull Egypt’s defense systems into a further sense of security, Israel’s June 5th air force radio transmissions were pre-recorded and transmitted over the airwaves as decoy communications for the consumption of Egyptian surveillance.

Radio silence was so strictly adhered to that Israeli air crews maintained absolute radio silence even as they conducted the initial bombing run.

In case of mid air malfunction, Israeli crews were instructed to leave their formations in silence, fly back to base at low altitude, and, if necessary, to eject. 

The attack squadrons flew toward Egypt at a sufficiently low altitude so as to evade Egyptian radar. 

Incredibly, every formation reached its target without a word being uttered over the radio. 

Israel’s planning, daring and clear understanding of the threats it faced resulted in the successful bombing raids it needed against Egypt, and set the stage for the remainder of the war and the lightning fast Israeli victory that ensued, one studied by militaries throughout the globe to this day. 

With Egypt firmly on the back foot, the IAF crippled the Syrian Air Force, and destroyed targets in Iraq after the Iraqis entered the fray. 

Those same attitudes and principles remain essential for victory in the modern era and will play a crucial role in combating enemies that threaten Israel today. 

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Brigadier General Avishai Levi served for 30 years in the Israeli Air Force (IAF), a career that culminated as the Head of Intelligence and Reconnaissance for the IAF from 2007-2010. It was during his tenure that the Israeli Air Force successfully detonated the Syrian nuclear reactor.

ISRAEL MUST PRIORITIZE AMERICA OVER CHINA

By Oded Gour-Lavie

U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo recently made an unusual visit to Israel to warn against extending economic cooperation with China. Israel should not require such pressure in order to formulate an independent policy that is cautious of China, while at the same time, safely engages Beijing. 

The decision by the Israeli government to allow a Chinese state-owned company to build and operate a privately owned port in Haifa, constitutes a significant security issue. 

It represents a narrow, economics-based form of decision making, which conceded a strategic asset. 

A U.S. built port in Haifa, would have been far more preferable.  

It has also angered Israel's principal and most powerful ally, the United States, which will remain Israel's top ally, at least for the coming decades. Unlike China, the U.S.'s values closely match and mirror those of Israel.

Long-term strategic thinking should have been what did and what will inform the core considerations and decisions surrounding the granting of such contracts. Such considerations should trump economic incentives.

Israeli governments have a duty to consider every such contract first and foremost through the lens of geo-strategic considerations. Awaiting American pressure in order to do so is a mistake. 

Mike Pompeo's visit, alongside public statements by Chinese and American leaders, has caused some observers to wonder whether the U.S. and China are on a path to economic decoupling and a new escalation in their rivalry. 

In the current global order, with its complex economic systems and interdependency, a full decoupling is not an inevitability. Even prior to the outbreak of the Coronavirus pandemic, China and the U.S. were engaged in a global struggle over their economic interests and their international influence. The U.S.'s strategy includes regaining its lost manufacturing power, and getting China to pay for that shift to the extent that it can do so. 

The current conditions will very likely intensify this preexisting struggle. 

China has been steadily using its economic, regional development and diplomatic capabilities, to buy and take over industries in multiple locations; an approach that very much strengthens China's international trade infrastructure, economy, manufacturing, and ability to boost its GNP. 

Taking advantage of the Trump Administration's 'America First' approach, which has reduced American participation abroad and assistance to other countries, China has moved into vacuums and open spaces in order to increase its influence. 

That maneuver is natural and practical for a massive state that requires a growing quantity of supplies and capabilities. 

The U.S. may now seek to recruit countries to its struggle against China, a struggle which, until now, it was waging unilaterally. Israel's own role in this epic struggle is small. It must prioritize and protect the strategic anchor that is the alliance with Washington which is the highest strategic order for Jerusalem. 

China, with its technology and economic prowess, has been keen to invest in infrastructure projects in Israel, and to gain access to Israeli technology. Israel must always keep its finger on the pulse of such investments, keeping investment beating, but never garroting its vital strategic interests in the process. 

Allowing China to take control of Israel's 5G cellular network, for example, would mean ceding control of the information being relayed on the network to someone else. 

While it's true that networks can be hacked regardless of who built them, it is easier for a global power to control and bring down a network it built on its own.

Similarly, a highly strategic seaport should not be in the hands of a power that can quickly change its views on Israeli interests, and which lacks common values with Israel. 

Again, a U.S. built port in Haifa, would have been far more preferable. 

Ultimately, the time has come for Israel to minimize Chinese involvement in strategic infrastructure projects, as quickly as possible, and to decrease the amount of time that Israel is committed to pre-existing projects. 

Several papers produced by the Haifa Maritime Policy and Strategy center (HMS) have laid out the argument for such an approach.

The matter at hand is one to be played out delicately. 

On the one hand. Foreign investment on sensitive projects should be the preserve of the strongest of allies. When Israel purchases submarines from Germany, for example, it does so knowing that it can rely on the German government for parts in the hour of need. 

On the other hand, Significant caution must be applied to any suggested breaking of ties with China. Beijing is a highly significant power, with many advantages for those who engage with it. Those include production and manufacturing abilities, efficient implementation, economic investment opportunities, and a desire to work with Israel.

Those assets are not to be casually discarded. 

Diplomatically, Israel must also take care not to be dragged into anti-Chinese sentiments or statements. It need not take up a frontline position in the campaign against China, and it is not in a position that justifies or requires it taking on such a role. 

The struggle against China is not an Israeli one, but in the coming months, Israel must monitor the global U.S. – Chinese struggle while making its own decisions in accordance with its own strategic imperatives; something that inherently mandates China’s subjugation to America in the mindset of Israeli policy makers. 

A clear line on where and when to engage with China - or not - should be drawn at vulnerable, strategic sites. Vulnerability and strategy should serve as the guiding lighthouses for Israel’s future engagement with China, and Israel's relationship with America must remain the clearcut priority.

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Rear Admiral Oded Gour-Lavie (Ret.) is a publishing Expert at The MirYam Institute. He concluded his career in 2014 as the Head of the IDF’s Legal & Strategic Policy Team. Prior to that, he served as Head of Naval Operations and was Commander of a submarine flotilla.

SIX DAYS & THE FOREVER WAR

By Frank Sobchak

This June marks the 53rd anniversary of Israel’s lightning victory in the 1967 Six Day War when the Israel Defense Forces defeated the combined militaries of several of its neighbors.  

Israel’s decisive military victory is often studied by the armed forces of other nations and many have applied its lessons in other conflicts. 

This year also marks eighteenth year of constant conflict for the U.S. in what was originally named the global war on terrorism. The juxtaposition of these two conflicts brings pause to military strategists and begs the question if Israel’s success in 1967 could ever be repeated, there or elsewhere.

In the U.S., children who were not born at the time of the 9/11attacks are now old enough to fight in the seemingly never ending conflict, an all too common situation amongst members of the military whose offspring are statistically more likely to follow in their parent’s footsteps.  

It is a situation that Israel is also familiar with, having seen the success of 1967 dissipate into a protracted conflict against amorphous terrorist groups, guerrillas, and extremist organizations after the 1973 Yom Kippur War. 

Pundits of all political persuasions in both countries have bemoaned this parallel development, arguing that such a perpetual “Forever War” threatens the fabric of democratic governments, erodes societal civil military relations, creates too many casualties to bear, and generates costs that destroy opportunities for future generations. Yet is this seemingly everlasting struggle as bad as they make out? 

It is important to note that I am not advocating that war is a good thing. I have lost friends, classmates, subordinates, and students to the unforgiving scythe of battle and wish that we all could live out the rest of our days in peace. But I also recognize their sacrifices have tamped down war’s natural tendencies to escalate and expand and that these seemingly endless conflicts have prevented much larger and much bloodier wars from developing. 

This is also not to say that both countries have always fought their conflicts intelligently. The Iraq War will probably go down in U.S. history as one of the worst foreign policy blunders in the history of the Republic. 

Yet although the prolonged fighting has been devastating at the individual and family level, we should recognize two facts. First, that the conflict both nations are engaged in is a war of ideas against nebulous transnational actors, a struggle that is not likely to be won decisively. 

Second, that the current era of conflict, by comparison to other time periods in history and other wars, is far less destructive than almost all the wars of the past.

One of the main reasons why we should not be deceived into assuming that either country could safely walk away from conflict without it boomeranging back is because we are in a war of ideas against a loosely aligned set of violent extremist organizations. 

The U.S. has fought ideologies before and won great victories: against slavery and white supremacy in the U.S. Civil War, Nazism and Fascism World War II, and Communism during the Cold War. 

Israel has had to fight the very notion that it should not be allowed to exist. 

Yet even in those conflicts, the core ideology of each group sadly persists today and we still have to fight neo-Nazis, white supremacists, anti-Semites, and other villainy. Destroying an ideology is nearly impossible, even after defeating it on the field of battle and discrediting its supporters.  

Furthermore, because we are fighting a networked non-state actor spread across the globe that hides amongst the population, rooting out their poisonous creed is much more difficult.  

In this struggle, there will be no surrender by our enemies under the guns of the battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay.  Hamas, Hezballah, Al Qai’da, and ISIS will not be giving up anytime soon. To force those organizations to capitulate would require such horrors that we should thank providence that we are in a forever war rather than a traditional conflict. 

In World War II, the allies had to resort to firebombing cities and dropping atomic bombs to convince Germany and Japan to surrender, even though rationally there was no pathway to victory for either of those nations after mid-1944 (at the latest). Unfortunately, human beings will continue to fight, suffer, and die far past the point when they should logically give up.  

This point brings out a larger fact- that as horrible as the post 9/11 wars have been, they have been much less devastating than conventional wars. This is a truism of wars which have been called “low intensity conflicts” because casualties are often a fraction of what they are in larger struggles. 

American losses in more traditional forms of warfare include 405,000 killed in World War II, 58,000 in Vietnam, and 36,000 in Korea. Israel lost nearly 3,000 soldiers during the Yom Kippur War, and 1,000 during the Six Day War. By contrast, the two decade long “Global War on Terrorism” has claimed roughly 7,000 American combatants. 

By comparison, the U.S. lost roughly the same number of soldiers in one month during the battle of Iwo Jima, as it did during the Forever War. 

As painful as the losses were, Israel’s casualties amounted to under 100 soldiers killed during the 2014 invasion of Gaza and approximately 200 in all the conflicts with Lebanon and Hizbollah since the year 2000. 

Those losses occurred in the prevention of amorphous groups from coalescing into powerful nation states against which any campaign would be much bloodier. 

Warfare has changed, as noted by military theorists and scholars such as Rupert Smith, Martin Van Creveld, and Sean McFate. 

In this new paradigm, conflict is timeless, almost unending and the venue of fighting has shifted from a traditional battlefield to one where parties operate amongst civilian populations.  

Rather than deny that these changes have occurred, we should recognize and accept them for what they are. We must live in the world as it is, not as we would like it to be. And in that world, the best option might just be the military equivalent of “mowing the lawn” every few years. 

When fighting a virulent ideology, an outcome of a protracted conflict where we endure a never-ending drip of a handful of losses a year is still better than the alternative of facing off against a well-armed, industrialized, and tech-savvy nation state. 

In such a context, the Forever War is likely the best that we can hope for.  While it is hard to stomach, such a truism reinforces the ancient wisdom: Only the dead have seen the end of war.

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Frank Sobchak is a PhD candidate in international relations at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and has taught at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Tufts University, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and The Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He holds a BS in Military History from West Point and a MA in Arab Studies from Georgetown University. Read full bio here.

Women Must Play an Equal Role in Israeli and Global Policymaking

By Sharon Roffe Ofir

For Israel and other countries to improve their response to national challenges, an increased presence of women in leadership positions is required.  

Many of Israel's political leaders are former generals, and while the Israel Defense Forces has recently realized the importance of integrating women, its effort to do so remains incomplete, despite the positive changes that have been made in a number of combat units. 

While they understandably attract the attention and faith of many voters, former generals are not necessarily the leaders that we need today in order to deal with the multitude of acute public-civilian problems that stand before us. In our political system, women constitute an unacceptably small percentage of Knesset Members. 

In March 2020, at the time of the national elections for the 23rd Knesset, a mere 5.5% of elected MK’s were women. The senior echelons of Israeli leadership are almost exclusively composed of men. The National Security Council, which is the official advisory body guiding the government's responses to the Coronavirus pandemic, does not include a single woman. 

The same was true of the experts committee established by the National Security Council, which at first included two female research assistants but no female experts. Only after a series of protest letters was sent by organizations and women, and a petition was submitted to the High Court of Israel, did the committee include a small number of female experts.    

A century ago, the Women's International Zionist Organization (WIZO) was established in Britain because the Zionist Congress had not incorporated women. Despite that effort, a look back over the last 100 years shows that little has changed. That realization should serve as a red flag and a call to action. Israel is filled with inspirational women, just as it has many inspirational men. The question remains as to why, time and again, we return to the default position of women being excluded.  

One of the answers lies in the socialization of society. Since our founding, Israel has been dominated by a militaristic worldview, necessarily so; but that has resulted in a near automatic tendency to push women to the sidelines. Despite the fact that Israel had a female prime minister relatively soon after its establishment, Golda Meir’s rise is reflective of an anomaly, not a trend.

As in many countries, exclusion is based on the false notion that only men can manage matters of state effectively. When I ran in the last round of elections in the Women's Voice party, I received criticism from the left, center, and right. All of them repeatedly asked why I was taking votes away from their cause. The notion that women's equality was a cause worthy of a voting constituency was one they automatically dismissed. The time has come to change that. That change must begin with women themselves. 

Women must first believe in their own abilities and capacity to contribute. We must operate with the understanding that achieving true equality is to the benefit everyone; men, women, society, the economy, the private sector, and many other sectors. Any field that has gender equality will be all the enriched by way of it.  

Israel’s National Women's Council For Civil Security, We Power, founded by Dr. Mazal Shaul, an organization of which I am proud to be a part, was established in response to the absence of female experts on the National Security Council. Its 150 members have created a unique strategic model for alternative ways of tackling challenges. 

The government's efforts to bring civilian life back to a functioning routine in the wake of COVID-19 has revealed many societal sub-stratas, including families that lack the computers needed to enable children to participate in remote learning. Decision makers overlooked that sub-strata. They correctly identified remote learning at the macro level but failed to cater to the need to find solutions for those who lack the resources at home.The education system is comprised mostly of women, who skillfully juggle their home and career demands. Their perspective and expertise are of the kind that could combine macro and micro aspects of remote learning participation when formulating government responses. 

Female leaders in the education system have found many creative solutions to enable children to return to schools and kindergartens. Combining a macro and micro approach, something embodied within women's perspectives, would have been of real assistance to the communications campaigns of the government as they sought to reach out to various strands of society during the pandemic response.

The Haredi community, for example, which is not online and does not watch television, did not always receive guidelines with sufficient time remaining for implementation. As a result, the government had to reconfigure the way in which it reached out to them, something that resulted in actual discord between the government and the ultra orthodox community and a perception of an even greater discord than was the reality among Israeli society, generally.

The same is true for the Israel’s Arab population, which struggled to buy food for Ramadan when stores were required to close early. These groups required a detail-oriented response, something at which women excel. Had more of us been at the heart of legislating, these scenarios would have been better managed.

The United Nations has called for women to make up 50 percent of international leadership by the year 2030. This is a welcome call, but alongside it, I would add my call for the establishment of an international women's leadership council. This body could address many crises around the world, offering much needed, new perspectives as they do so. 

Examples of successful female leadership are growing, but it’s only a beginning and must be built upon. They include the prime minister of New Zealand and Denmark and the former president of South Korea, but there is more to be done.A passing glance at Israel’s new governing coalition, less than a quarter of which are women, is sufficient proof of the fact that the path toward adequate female representation remains long, and that legislative initiatives and committees focused upon gender equality do not play a significant role in the complex coalition agreements. 

The establishment of an international council would go some way to promoting this change, and Israel would have many wonderful women that it could contribute to such an organization.

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Sharon Roffe Ofir is deputy Mayor of Kiriyat Tivon, in the Haifa region. She is in charge of government relations and gender equality and is a member of WCCS (Women's Council for Civil Security) strategy group.

APPLYING SOVEREIGNTY IS IN ISRAEL'S SECURITY INTEREST

By Amir Avivi

When assessing Israel’s core national security interests, applying Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan Valley fits squarely within the list of Israeli needs.

Our nation, with its ancient past, must take an equally long view of it’s future, particularly given the many security challenges that likely await us in the near and more distant term.  

Israel must act to solidify its key needs in the fields of security, economy, and development and must not hesitate when doing so. 

In just fifty years from now our population is projected to exceed 20 million people. In order to thrive, not just survive, we must have a minimally defensible eastern border, located in the Jordan Valley, and it must retain control of the eastern mountain ridge.

Yitzhak Rabin, architect of the Oslo Accords, in the eponymous ‘Rabin parameters’ included full Israeli security control over Jewish cities in Judea and Samaria/the West Bank, and full freedom of maneuver for Israelis along the main roads of the area, within those parameters. He did so based on the need to protect the large Israeli communities of Judea and Samaria known today as the ‘Settlement blocs.’

But Israel's civilian presence in Judea and Samaria extends far beyond those blocs, and retaining control over those additional areas in perpetuity is a puzzle we finally have an opportunity to solve. 

The Trump peace plan, with its endorsement of the application of Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan Valley, accurately reflects the Rabin parameters. It also calls for a two-state solution, and a demilitarized Palestinian state, with Israeli security control over the entire area between the Jordan river and the Mediterranean sea, along with a permanent presence in the Jordan Valley. 

The surprising alignment between these two plans begets a moment in time not to be missed by Israel. The reasons to proceed with sovereignty go beyond the commonality of Rabin’s and Trump’s visions, however; in ways that ought to temper the panic and pessimism disseminated by those who portray Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan valley as a portent for catastrophe.  

The Trump peace plan was coordinated with Sunni states, Israel and the US Administration.

That coordination is the result of the Sunni view that an alliance with Israel is an existential imperative in their fight against Iran, something that is of far greater significance to them than the Palestinian-Arab cause.

Economically, the dependence of these states upon economic aid and ties to the U.S. render any frantic statements of what awaits following the application of sovereignty just that - statements.  

In particular, Jordan, despite its rhetoric, is unlikely to cancel its peace treaty with Israel. It is Israel and the U.S. that stabilize Jordan, not the other way around. There is no Jordanian interest in having a Palestinian military presence on their western border. 

The primary, essential distinction between the Trump plan and the Rabin parameters is one that ought to be welcomed; the demand for the Palestinians to meet their responsibilities, come to the negotiating table and fashion a way forward.

Some, particularly on the Israeli Left, who are concerned about the potential for a deterioration in our security situation if sovereignty is applied, endorse ideas that are counter-strategic. They advocate for short-term arrangements for an Israeli presence on the Jordan Valley and in Judea and Samaria, to be assessed and reassessed in increments of ten to fifteen years.  

But the question of what happens beyond that timeframe will have to be revisited, regularly and often. If we wait, the opportunity to apply sovereignty may no longer enjoy the backing of the world’s only superpower.

Neither a spike in Palestinian violence, nor rocket fire from Hamas, nor a rupture in Israel’s relationship with Jordan – nor a combination of all three; all of which are held up as reasons not to apply sovereignty, should deter us from advancing our vital interests.   

A cursory glance at our history helps to outline the importance of pursuing such interests.

In 1948, Israel concluded the War of Independence with extended control over territory that expanded beyond the areas given to it by the UN partition plan, including approximately half of the Sinai Peninsula. 

Significant pressure, emanating from the U.S. and Russia, was applied to Israel to withdraw. David Ben Gurion, Israel’s Prime Minister at the time and a master strategist, was prepared to return the land captured in the Sinai, but was unwilling to do so with regard to any other area of land. 

Ben Gurion, leader of what was then a small, young and relatively weak country, stood firm in the face of pressure from the world's superpowers, prioritizing strategy over tactics as he did so.  

Today’s Israel is incomparably more powerful than it was during those founding years.

The scare tactics employed to decry the virtue of applying sovereignty ought to be recognized as the hollow cat-calls that they are. Such pessimistic tales of woe were employed in advance of the U.S. recognition of Israel's sovereignty over the Golan Heights and Washington’s relocation of its embassy to Jerusalem. Those predictions failed to materialize, however.  

The region did not catch fire. Those who thought it would, or who fear that it will if Israel applies sovereignty, fail to realize that the region has changed beyond recognition. 

The Palestinian public in Judea and Samaria, for its part, has demonstrated that it is primarily interested in its economic wellbeing. Not only has the Palestinian-Arab street shown little appetite to return to the days of the Second Intifada, if it did, Israel's security control renders it almost impossible for a full-scale uprising to erupt. 

Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan valley should be applied, swiftly - the stars are finally aligned for Israel to not only affix its eastern border, but to cement a secure future for itself. 

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Brigadier General Amir Avivi concluded his service as the Head of the Auditing and Consulting Department of the Israeli Defense Establishment, (including the Israel Defense Force, the Ministry of Defense and Israeli Military Industries).